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I.   Introduction  
 
In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis, financial 
regulation in the European Union, following an international trend, 
underwent a process of intensive legal reforms that led to the revision of the 
legal premises underpinning the EU architectural framework for financial 
regulation and supervision.  The EU has attempted to design a better 
equipped supranational apparatus for the governance of financial markets 
and crises.   This effort accompanies a more general questioning of the role 
of law in the financial sector.   The interaction between financial entities 
and legal rules has been re examined and novel theories have focused on 
the idea that legal norms are constitutive elements of finance,1 rather than 
exogenous phenomena that intervene upon markets’ spontaneous order as a 
deus ex machina.  In addition, the behavioral dynamics influencing the 
 
 1. Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J.  OF  COMP.  ECON.  315 (2013). 
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choices financial consumers, professional investors and other actors of the 
financial markets has been scrutinized.  The interaction between financial 
markets and regulators has been also considered through an enriched, 
socio-legal vision.2  These novel approaches helps to understand that the 
interaction among regulators, financial entities and consumers occurs 
through legal and social constructions.  Furthermore, the postulate of 
rationality developed in financial economics and influencing the regulators’ 
understanding of finance has been questioned.3  It is now largely 
understood that individual cognitive processing has limited capacity and 
that the brain economizes upon such processing by relying on heuristics 
and other shortcuts, which will save time but also generate biases and 
predictable errors.4  Behavioral finance moved from the fringes of financial 
economics to the mainstream stage:5 Regulatory actions are refined in order 
to take into account these insights that depart from the traditional 
rationality paradigm.6  
Despite this attention towards the social and psychological dimensions of 
finance, the behavioral dynamics defining regulators’ modus operandi remains an 
uncharted area.  Echoing the distinction between “rules of the game” and “players” 
as key components of markets elaborated in the literature of institutional 
economics,7 regulators are at best depicted as players and thus considered as units, 
in the form of social actors or organizations.  Albeit offering a useful simplification, 
such an understanding neglects that organizations are composed of individuals 
with objectives that may conflict, even if operating in a cooperative fashion under 
an overarching structure.8  Veering from this unitary conception, there is a 
flourishing literature in anthropological and sociological studies that considers 
 
 2. Julia Black, Reconceiving Financial Markets – From the Economic to the Social, 13 J.  
OF  CORP.  L.  STUD.  401 (2013). 
 3. In the UK, see Financial Services Authority (FSA), The Turner Review: A Regulatory 
Response To The Global Banking Crisis, Ref.  No.  003289 (March 2009), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. 
 4. Kristine Erta et al., Applying Behavioral Economics at the Financial Conduct Authority, 
Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper No.  1 (April 2013), available at https://www. 
fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-1.pdf. 
 5. This is witnessed by the fact that Robert Shiller, considered one of the fathers of 
behavioural finance, shared in 2013 the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel with Eugene Fama, commonly referred as the father of the efficient-
markets hypothesis, based on the rationality postulate.   
 6. Emilio Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance Regulation: In 
Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J.  OF  CORP.  L.  STUD.  23 (2009). 
 7. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE, 3 - 5 (Cambridge University Press 1990). 
 8. See generally,  Geoffrey M.  Hodgson, What are Institutions?, 40 J.  OF  ECON.  ISSUES 1 (2006). 
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administrative agencies, such as regulators, as collective entities.9  Through these 
lenses, supranational regulatory and supervisory outcomes stem from decision-
making processes organized by legal provisions that define: membership criteria, 
organizational structures with collegial governing bodies, powers, responsibilities, 
as well as goals and objectives for each institutions.   
For our purpose, and drawing from these studies, financial regulators 
are considered as organizations composed of individuals.  The conduct of 
those individuals are impacted by the legal design as well as by the conduct 
of other individuals and organizations, such as investors, depositors, and 
various financial firms populating the heterogeneous financial ecosystem.  
The external relationship of regulators towards regulated sectors, the public at 
large, or the political powers, have received extensive consideration in the 
regulatory literature.10  Our paper examines how the legal dimension 
influences the relational dynamics within regulators.  Drawing on insights 
from social psychology, regulators appear to reach decisions through 
processes that can be identified and analyzed as collective decision 
making,11 shaped by social roles, cultural norms as well as legal design.  
Social psychology provides a language that enables to capture and analyze 
these aspects,12 as it focuses on the result of individual interactions within 
or among groups.13  Social psychology provides an analytical grid that, for 
the first time, our paper uses to examine financial regulatory agencies.   
Against this backdrop, we focus on the EU institutions directly 
involved in the governance of financial markets with the primary objective 
of identifying whether basic sociopsychological models could be associated 
with the legal framework.  For this purpose, we examine the legal rules and 
the EU constitutional framework under which regulatory bodies operate.  EU 
institutions perform their activities and roles within the perimeters of EU law, 
as defined by the constitutional provisions enshrined in the Treaty of the 
 
 9. See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (Syracuse University  Press 1986) 
 10. See generally, ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING 
REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY AND PRACTICE (Oxford University. Press 2012). 
 11. See Floyd H.  Allport, A Structural Conception of Behavior: Individual and Collective - 
Structural Theory and the Master Problem of Social Psychology, 64 J. OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOL.  & 
SOC.  PSYCHOL.  3 (1962). 
 12. A classical definition of social psychology was given by Gordon Allport: “Social 
psychology is the attempt to understand and explain how the thoughts, feeling, and behaviours of 
individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of other human being”; GW 
Allport, The Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 1, at  5 (G.  Lindzey ed., Addison-Wesley 1954).   
 13. Although there is some overlap between sociology and social psychology, there are 
also differences.  Sociologists tend to relate social behaviours to norms, roles, social class 
and other structural variables.  Differently, social psychologists focus on the goals, motives and 
cognitions of individuals operating in a social context. 
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European Union (TEU)14 and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).15  The dynamics amongst the members composing the main 
decision-making bodies of these institutions are examined with reference to 
public documents, such as judicial decisions, official communications, and 
independent reviews of EU institutions.  This enables us to focus on the 
relational dynamics defining regulators’ actions — with reference to their 
primary decision-making bodies —  and to relate them to the ‘fundamental 
forms of sociality’, as isolated by Alan Fiske in his seminal work.16  Fiske, 
bridging different studies and building upon own ethnographic research, 
isolates four relational modes in a unified theory of social relations.  The 
relational modes are archetypes describing the elementary forms of 
sociality featuring in every culture and characterizing all social 
interactions.  These four models, illustrated in detail in the third part of this 
paper, are: i) Market Pricing, ii) Equality Matching, iii) Communal 
Sharing, and iv) Authority Ranking.17  They operate in all domains of 
social action and cognition, such as transfer of property, standards of social 
justice, groups decisions, social influence, organization of labor, moral 
judgments, response to suffering, and interpretation of human behaviors.  
Combinations between the four models result into various forms of social 
interactions pursuant to general cultural rules.18 At a more fundamental 
level, “the relational models theory explains social life as a process of 
seeking, making, sustaining, repairing, adjusting, judging, construing, and 
sanctioning relationships.”19   
The analysis of EU financial regulators through the prism of the four 
fundamental forms of sociality has the potential of opening up new 
perspectives.  It can offer a better understanding of how these institutions 
works and a robust conceptual framework to consider how conflicts within 
and among institutions are likely to arise.  However, what cannot be 
directly inferred from the behavioral dynamics of specific decision-making 
bodies, is the overall psychological attitude (or culture) of the regulatory 
 
 14. Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007 [2009], later known as Treaty of the European Union, 
consolidated in 2016 C 202/16, O.J [hereinafter TEU]. 
 15. Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007 [2009], Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
consolidated in 2016 C 202/16, O.J [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 16. Alan Page Fiske, The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality: Framework for a Unified Theory 
of Social Relations, 99 PSYCHOL.  REV.  689, 689 (1992) [hereinafter Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality]. 
 17. Identified by Fiske through field study in West Africa and also uncovered at the same 
period in other branches of social sciences.  See ALAN PAGE FISKE, STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL LIFE: 
THE FOUR ELEMENTARY FORMS OF HUMAN RELATIONS (Free Press, 1991).  [hereinafter Fiske, 
Structures of Social Life]. 
 18. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 690. 
19. Id. at 689.   
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agencies under scrutiny.  In fact, by steering away from the idea that 
regulators are unitary entities, various forms of sociality naturally 
characterize only specific bodies within agencies and institutions.  Yet, 
given that these bodies are ultimately responsible for determining critical 
regulatory outcomes, mapping their inherent behavioral dynamics appears 
to offer a novel set of analytical tools through which regulatory activities 
could be examined.  To this end, we elicit the underlying core relational 
blueprint, or dominant relational model characterizing the decision-making 
process of EU institutions in discharging their regulatory functions towards the 
financial sector.  Particular attention will be given to the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the European Supervisory 
Authorities.  From a theoretical standpoint, a given relational structure calls for 
specific decision making processes, group dynamic, and governing values.  
However, tensions and prolonged dissents among individuals operating in a 
collective structure may extend the natural divergence of opinions and affect 
relational dynamics sustaining the cooperative efforts.  The article then applies 
the analytical framework offered by social psychology to the current issues that 
financial, economic, and political crises have exacerbated.   
The overhaul of the EU architectural framework for financial 
regulation and supervision, leading to the establishment of a Banking 
Union and triggering the agenda for a broader Financial Union, generated 
constitutional conundrums in the EU primary law.  It created overlaps and 
tensions amongst EU institutions that are designed to protect the stability of 
the single currency and EU institutions that are in charge of the integrity of 
the single market as a whole.  As a result, an increasingly sharper divide 
emerges between Member States taking part to the euro-area (Eurozone) 
and Member States whose currency is not the euro (non-Eurozone) and that 
are not participating in the Banking Union.  This divide furthers with the 
threats to the unity of the European project posed by the UK decision to 
leave the EU following the results of the referendum (held on June 23, 
2016) and generally termed as Brexit.  This fragmentation calls into 
question the reliance on common values underpinning and guiding the 
collective decision-making process of EU financial regulators, when the 
representatives of Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries have to cooperate.  
Hence, the sociopsychological perspective appears also useful to advance 
prospective analyses over a variety of critical aspects affecting the unfolding 
European architectural framework for financial regulation and supervision. 
As a prerequisite to the sociopsychological examination of EU 
financial regulators, the article offers a typology to navigate through the 
complex, multilayered EU architectural framework for financial markets 
supervisions and regulation.  The typology is constructed by reference to 
two dimensions: the function of institutions vis-à-vis the common interest 
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of the Union, on the one hand; the constitutional status of such institutions, 
on the other hand.  First, the EU is a sui generis regional structure, 
constructed as an international legal community.  Its institutions are 
inspired by a “common interest,” and are also designed to pursue such 
interest, which, in turn, is an autonomous and fluid concept that does not 
necessarily overlap with the interests of its individual members.  Specific 
institutional capacities are required to define the legal and policy contents of 
the common interest and to carry on its effective development.  Hence, it 
emerges that EU regulators perform three key functions vis-à-vis the general 
interest of the Union, i.e., advancing and protecting its existence, defining its 
content, and ensuring its operation throughout the Union.  Second, regulators 
may be classified into two main categories, by reference to their constitutional 
statuses.  Only some financial regulatory institutions are established through EU 
primary law: the European Commission (the Commission) and the European 
Central Bank (ECB).  Other financial institutions in the EU, such as the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
have been created through secondary laws, whilst supervisory coordination 
amongst national authorities over cross-border financial entities and operations 
occurs through Colleges of Supervisors and, within the Banking Union, Joint 
Supervisory Teams.  These are network-based mechanisms, governed primarily 
through memoranda of understandings and secondary law provisions. 
This typology is not merely descriptive.  Beyond the classification of the 
institutions, it offers a useful tool to identify how EU institutions operate.  
Typically, the two dimensions, i.e., the function of the institutions vis-à-vis the 
common interest, first, and the constitutional status of the institutions, second, 
bear a direct relationship with specific relational models.  This means that 
where a given decision-making organ within an institution performs more 
than one function, more than one model of sociality is expected to operate.  
Also, we find that institutions whose legitimacy and remit is enshrined in the 
Treaty framework appear to follow the Communal Sharing and the Equality 
Matching forms of sociality, where considerations over common interest and 
balance within the group establish the ground for a structured cooperation.  
By contrast, notwithstanding the specific reference to the pursuit of the 
common interest in the remits of the ESAs, they appear to organize their 
social relationship around Market Pricing models, where the maximization 
of individual interests, i.e., the interests of Member States advanced by the 
individuals composing the decision-making bodies of the ESA, dominates 
the group dynamics.    
The argument of this article develops in five parts.  Part II introduces 
the EU multilevel architectural framework for financial regulation and 
supervision, stressing the waves of reforms that led to the current 
governance apparatus.  Subsequently, the concept of common interest is 
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introduced and the typology for financial regulators is constructed by 
focusing on the Commission, the ECB and the ESAs, with reference to 
other form of institutional cooperation among financial regulators.  Part III 
illustrates the theory of relational models.  It then applies it to isolate the 
dominant relational modes for each of the above-mentioned institutions 
within the EU legal order.  Part IV offers an application of the socio-
psychological framework in the context of the current tension between 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries.  Conclusive remarks will follow in 
Part V.    
 
II.   The Architectural Framework for Financial Regulation in 
the European Union  
 
The EU multilevel governance developed to provide new mechanisms 
to address an increasingly complex and diverse range of policy issues 
requiring enhanced supranational coordination.20  In its current form, it 
strongly departs from the initial design, whereby the supranational 
decision-making process was confined to specific domains that were dealt 
within the fora offered by Treaty-based institutions, largely following the 
unanimity principle amongst founding members.21  The EU governance 
framework has evolved into a broader apparatus with its own system of rules 
and procedures, where the recourse to delegated legislations follow the logics 
of the “regulatory state.”22  These developments lie at the core of the transition 
from the Common Market to the Internal Market overarching aim, as 
introduced with the Single European Act and reinforced, in particular, by the 
Treaty of Maastricht and the Lisbon Treaty.23  However, the translation of 
the general EU principles into administrative and regulatory actions 
advancing the integration of national financial markets proved to be one of 
the most difficult ambits for the European project.24  
 
 20. On the emergence of multi-level governance in different sectors, see e.g., David Coen & 
Mark Thatcher, Network Governance and Multi-Level Delegation: European Networks of 
Regulatory Agencies, 28 J.  OF  PUB.  POL’Y 49 (2008). 
 21. See, e.g., Jacques Pelkmans, The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standardization, 25 J.  OF COMMON MKT.  STUD.  249 (1987). 
 22. See, e.g., Giandomendico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17 w.  
eur.  pol.  77 (1994); see also, Thomas Christiansen, Goverance in the European Union, in 
MICHELLE CINI & NIEVES PEREZ-SOLORZANO BORRAGAN, EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS (5th ed.  
2016) (for an evolution of the EU governance approaches). 
 23. The Single European Act, 1987 (L169) O.J.  29, paved the way to economic and 
monetary union set forth in the Treaty of Maastricht. 
 24. See generally, Lucia Quaglia, “Old” and “New” Politics of Financial Services 
Regulation in the European Union, 17 NEW POL.  ECONOMY 515 (2012); see also, Emiliano 
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The resulting architectural framework for financial regulation and 
supervision in the EU designs a complex institutional arrangement that 
involves supranational institutions and national authorities linked through 
mechanisms of cooperation and coordination.  General policy objectives, 
such as the integration of financial services or the maintenance of financial 
stability, justify regulatory and supervisory convergences that are 
increasingly more centralized at the supranational level.  The authorities 
involved in these tasks respond to different logics that are set forth in the 
constitutional premises of EU primary laws and influenced by the interests 
of Member States, which may not necessarily collimate with those of the 
Union at large.  After presenting the developments leading to the current 
multilevel governance framework for financial regulatory governance, the 
various institutions involved are considered in light of the function they 
perform towards the advancement, the identification, and the realization of the 
EU general interest.  It will emerge that the different levels of institutional 
engagement with the broad — and often vague — overarching goal of 
pursuing a common interest characterize the relational dynamics within 
institutions, which may ultimately affect their decision-making process. 
 
A. The EU Multi-level Governance of Financial   
Regulation  
  
The modern architectural framework for financial regulation and 
supervision in the EU is rooted in the Treaty framework and builds upon a 
series of profound reforms spanning decades.  For exposition clarity, three 
consecutive phases of reform could be isolated, starting from the turn of the 
century.  Each phase sets the legal and institutional premises upon which new 
legal and regulatory changes have been implemented.  The first phase, 
covering the first years of the new millennium, was marked by the 
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), comprising 42 
measures — to be adopted over six years (1999-2004) — intended to 
harmonize the legal rules affecting various aspects of banking, insurance 
and securities sectors as well as other forms financial services.25  The 
enterprise followed the primary policy objective of establishing an 
integrated financial market, given that its development was lagging behind 
 
Grossman, Network  European Financial Integration: Finally the Great Leap Forward?, 49 J.  OF 
COMMON MKT.  STUD.   413 (2011); For an earlier comment, see EU Securities Market 
Regulation: Adapting to the Needs of a Single Capital Market, Centre for European Policy 
Studies Task Force, Report No.  34 (Mar. 1, 2001). 
 25. See Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 
232, European Commission (May 11, 1999). 
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the general process of economic integration.  A high level of legal 
harmonization, mutual recognition and the passport rule were the core 
principles to ensure a single market for financial services.  The backbone of 
this ambitious plan was offered in the Lamfalussy Report,26 which also 
established the ground for a novel rule-making process, commonly referred 
to as the Lamfalussy Process.27  The Lamfalussy Process, gave a new 
legislative impetus and affirmed the prominence of the EU institutional 
apparatus in the rule-making process, with a consequential curtailment of 
the regulatory powers of Member States.  With the completion of the FSAP 
a process of review started, characterized by a relative tranquility and, more 
generally, by the archival of the Constitutional Treaty and the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
The second and the third phase have been initiated during the Seventh 
European Parliament (2009-2014) and continue to present days, with the 
Eighth European Parliament (2014-2019).  In particular, the second phase is 
marked by the reforms adopted as a response to the Global Financial Crisis 
that affected European countries as a diffused credit crisis, a sovereign debt 
crisis, and the consequential eurocrisis.  While markets and regulators were 
enjoying a period of regulatory pause after the adoption of the FSAP, the 
unfolding crises required profound revisions with a shift in the primary 
objectives.  The establishment of a single market mutated into the 
necessity of preserving its integrity by designing new rules and a new 
institutional framework to prevent and cope with financial crises at the 
supranational level.  The de Larosière Report on the Global Financial 
Crisis offered the blueprint for such reforms.28  One of the first 
measures consisted in the establishment of a European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS),29 which transformed the Lamfalussy 
committees into three ESAs and established the ESRB, entrusted with 
the responsibility of overseeing the integrity of the European financial 
system.30 The ESAs are composed of representatives of Member States’ 
regulatory authorities and are: the European Banking Authority 
 
 26. A. Lamfalussy, D. Wright & P Delsaux, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men 
on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, 85, 89, 93, & 95 (Feb. 15, 2001). 
 27. For a comprehensive review of the rule-making process enacted through the Lamfalussy 
Process see Niamh Maloney, The Lamfalussy Legislative Model: A New Era for the EC Securities 
and Investment Services Regime, 52 INT’L AND COMP.  L. Q. 509 (2003) (for a comprehensive review 
of the rule-making process enacted through the Lamfalussy Process). 
 28. The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU: Report, The de Larosiere 
Group (Feb. 25, 2009). 
 29. Council Directive 2010/78, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 120, 120 (EU). 
 30. Council Regulation 1092/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1, 2 (EU); Council Regulation 1096/2010, 
2010 O.J.  (L 331) 162 (EU). 
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(EBA),31 the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA),32 and the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA).33  The roles among various EU institutions and Member States 
resulted segmented following a three-layered allocation of 
responsibilities.  These are:  
 
i.) A supranational level, where the Commission acts as primary 
financial regulator, with rule-drafting and policy-setting 
prerogatives established by EU primary laws to define a 
harmonized set of rules.   
 
ii.)   A national level, where supervisory tasks have been primarily 
allocated.  Member States’ administrative authorities have 
been called to ensure the application of the EU law under the 
principle of mutual recognition and the passport rule and 
supervisory responsibilities have been distributed between 
‘home’ and ‘host’ jurisdictions for cross-border financial 
entities and operations.  A further mechanism of coordination 
has been offered by an increased reliance on Colleges of 
Supervisors, which are network-based structures of national 
authorities established to supervise multinational entities.   
 
iii)   The intermediate level was introduced with the establishment of 
the ESAs.  The ESAs offer both technical assistance to the 
Commission in the drafting of regulatory standards and 
coordination in conducting supervisory tasks.  Hence they are 
intended to enhance both ‘horizontal’ cooperation, i.e., among 
national authorities, and ‘vertical’ cooperation, i.e. between 
national authorities and the Commission.34  
 
The third phase of institutional reforms is landmarked by an 
enhancement of supranational centralization, with the establishment of a 
Banking Union, which, since 2014, has acquired more definitive legal 
 
 31. Council Regulation 1093/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12 (EU) [hereinafter EBA Regulation]. 
 32. Council Regulation 1094/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 48, 49 (EU). 
 33. Council Regulation 1095/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84, 85 (EU) [hereinafter ESMA 
Regulation]. 
 34. Giuliano G.  Castellano et al., Reforming European Union Financial Regulation: Thinking 
through Governance Models, 23 EUR.  BUS.  L.  REV.  409 (2012). 
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contours.35  The Banking Union is composed of a Single Rulebook, a 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM),36 a Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM),37 and a Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme.38  From an 
institutional perspective, the SSM and the SRM substantially modifies the 
geometry of the architectural framework in the EU.  In fact, in the SSM, the 
ECB has been tasked with the power to directly and indirectly supervise 
credit institutions operating in Member States that adopts the euro as a 
common currency as well as those of EU countries that decide to join.  
Whereas rule-making prerogatives largely belong to the Commission in 
conjunction with the ESAs — in particular, to the EBA — the supervision of 
approximately 6,000 banking institutions has been allocated to the ECB within 
the SSM.  Albeit the enforcement relies on national authorities, the ECB 
enjoys direct sanctioning powers.  New coordination mechanisms have been 
established and the daily supervisory activity is carried out through Joint 
Supervisory Teams, composed of staff from both the ECB and the competent 
authorities of Member States where regulated credit institutions operate.   
The SRM took effect on January 1, 2016, and represents the legal and 
institutional framework for the orderly resolution and recovery of banks 
within the Banking Union.  The SRM is aligned with the needs of ensuring 
the integrity of the single market and complements the SSM by establishing 
Single Resolution Board (SRB),39 which represents the resolution authority 
for the financial entities directly supervised by the ECB (plus all cross-
border groups) and oversees national competent authorities.  The SRB 
administers the Single Resolution Fund.40  The Fund is made up of the 
contributions of market participants — primarily, but not exclusively, banks 
— of the nineteen Member States participating to the Banking Union.  It 
supports bank resolutions and is the first line of defense in case of a major 
financial crisis that requires public funds to rescue troubled financial 
institutions while ensuring the viability of their businesses.  The SSM and the 
SRM are essential elements of the Banking Union and represent a new 
configuration of powers and responsibilities between the central 
 
 35. See Niamh Moloney, European Banking Union: Assessing Its Risks and Resilience, 51 
COMMON L.  MKT.  REV.  1609 (2014) (for a comprehensive assessment of the EU Banking Union); 
But see, David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, Banking Union as Holy Grail: Rebuilding the Single 
Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe's Banks and ‘Completing’ Economic and Monetary 
Union, 51 NEW POL. ECON. 103 (2013) (on the different positions of EU Member States). 
 36. Council Regulation 1024/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 63, 63 — 64 (EU). 
 37. Council Regulation 2015/81, 2015 O.J.  (L 15/1) 1 (EU). 
 38. Council Common Position 2014 No.  49/2014, O.J.  (L 173) 149 (EC). 
 39. Council Regulation 806/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 225) 1 (EU). 
 40. Council Agreement 8457/14, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Single 
Resolution Fund, May 14, 2014. 
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(supranational) level and national supervisory structures. 
The new institutional arrangement does not replace the 
aforementioned tripartite distribution of competencies and responsibilities 
that applies across the entire Union.  However, as far as the Banking Union 
is concerned, the segmentation between supranational rule-making and 
national supervision is substantially reduced.  As further illustrated below, 
the resulting institutional arrangement stretches the boundaries of EU 
primary law and, in consideration of the different constitutional status of 
the ECB, the Commission, and the EBA, institutional conflicts may result.  
The trend towards a progressive centralization based on the collaboration 
with national authorities is likely to characterize the proximate future of EU 
financial regulation.  While in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
the attention has been primary towards the banking sector and financial 
stability constituted the primary policy objective for financial regulation,41 
the idea of deepening the integration across all financial sectors emerges 
distinctively from the Capital Markets Union project, as President Junker 
declared in his opening statement to the European Parliament.42  
 
B.   The Common Interest in EU Financial Regulatory 
Framework 
 
From the above, it is possible to identify in the key institutional 
players specific functions vis-à-vis the constitutional framework 
established by the Treaties.  Such a functional account differs from the 
more traditional distinction between institutions tasked with rule-making or 
supervisory powers.43  In particular, it is possible to isolate three main 
functions that EU institutions involved in the governance of financial 
markets should perform under the EU primary laws.  These are: (i) the 
safeguard and the advancement of a pan-European common interest; (ii) 
the definition of its contents, with regards to financial regulation; and (iii) 
the operative application of the measures enacted to protect or advance 
such a common interest.   
Recognizing and protecting a common interest lies at the roots of the 
 
 41. Niamh Moloney, The Legacy Effects of the Financial Crisis on Regulatory Design in the 
EU, in Eilís Ferran et al.,  (eds.), THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
152 (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
 42. Jean-Claude Juncker, Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session in 
Strasbourg, at  18, July 15, 2014, transcript available at http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs 
/jean-claude-juncker---political-guidelines.pdf. 
 43. See, e.g., NIMAH MOLONEY, EU SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION 
(Oxford EU Law Library, 3d.  ed., Oxford University Press 2014).   
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European project.  Yet its precise definition escapes specific legal 
parameters and appears to be a concept that generally reflects the ethos of 
the European project; a plurality of national interests is collapsed into the 
interest of one community where resources are shared through the 
establishment of a single market.  The Treaty of Paris of 1951 and Treaty 
of Rome of 1957 intended precisely to design an international legal 
framework to share resources among European countries in order to ensure 
the political and economic stability of the region.  As Robert Schuman 
stated in the Declaration of May 9, 1950, “[t]he solidarity in production 
thus established will make it plain that any war between France and 
Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”44  
The creation of a common market was, in fact, based on the pooled 
production of coal and steel.  This established the roots for a common 
interest and, in turn, required a supranational governance structure to 
safeguard and advance such an interest, namely the High Authority from 
which the modern Commission derives.  Upon this idealized construction, 
the common interest may be originally conceived as the interest in, first, 
creating and, then, protecting a single market.45  
The evolution of the European project, leading to a Union, builds upon 
this embryonic supranational apparatus, which progressively enlarged, 
reflecting the expansion of the perimeters of the common interest.46  
Further developments and elaborations provided by European institutions 
and, in particular, by the European Court of Justice, reveal that the common 
interest is not a static concept.  Rather it constitutes the essential bond for 
constructing the European project and for identifying Europe as a 
community.  Hence, the common interest seems to coincide with the 
preservation of the community in itself and, as such, it is superior to and 
autonomous from the interests of individual Member States. 
Since the landmark decision in Van Gend en Loos,47 EU law 
transcends national laws and diverges from traditional international legal 
 
 44. Robert Schuman, A United States of Europe, speech recorded in SELECTION OF TEXTS 
CONCERNING INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS OF THE COMMUNITY FROM 1950 TO 1982, 47, European 
Parliament Committee on Institutional Affairs (1982). 
 45. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v.  Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R., 
2-15 (this point emerges from the decision in this case, and is further illustrated below) [hereinafter Van 
Gend en Loos]. 
 46. See, DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW, Ch. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 
3d ed., 2014) (Chapter One provides a complete account of the evolution of the European Communities 
and the subsequent establishment of the European Union). 
 47. Van Gend en Loos, supra note 45, at 4.   In 2013, the Court of Justice marked the 50th 
anniversary of the judgment highlighting the constitutional importance of the judgment, see 
Conference Proceedings, May 15, 2013, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_95693/en/. 
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arrangements by creating a legal community whose members are: states, 
national administrations, as well as citizens, industries and corporations.  The 
judgment defined Europe as a legal community based on a new legal order that 
is independent from national legal systems.  Its members have direct 
relationships with the legal community through a series of rights and 
obligations that are justified by the pursuit of common interest.  The 
common interest is defined by the Court as the establishment of a common 
market,48 which translated into the commitment to establish a functioning 
internal market, pursuant to Article 26 of the TFEU. 
A modern reading of Van Gend en Loos indicates that the Court 
established the premises for a strong leadership of EU institutions towards 
Member States.  EU institutions have the monopoly over both the pursuit of 
community’s interest and the teleological reasoning that determines 
whether a specific action is legitimized under the pursuit of such a common 
interest.49  The authority thereby established appears to define a 
hierarchical organization well summarized in the doctrine of supremacy of 
European law over national law.50  These considerations have merit in 
offering a deeper understanding of the dynamics shaping the European 
constitutional architecture.  Nonetheless, they have to be juxtaposed to the idea 
that Member States accept their subordination to a supranational community 
not under a federalist legal doctrine.  Rather they accepted a voluntarily act of 
subordination, in specific areas, towards a community in which they are active 
and integral components.  This organization serves to both expand and 
advance the common interest of the community through its translation into 
objectives that could be pragmatically pursued by the EU governance 
apparatus.  For instance, the measures to increase the integration of 
financial services in the last decades have been identified by the 
Lamfalussy and the de Larosiere reports, which were then put forward by 
the Commission.51   
In the context of financial markets governance, financial stability is 
not a direct interest of the EU legal community.  Instead, it is a derived 
objective that emanates from the overarching interest of, first, integrating 
financial services through the free circulation of capital and services as 
currently enshrined in TFEU Article 26(2), and, then, by preserving the 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Damian Chalmers & Luis Barroso, What Van Gend en Loos Stands For?, 12 INT’L J. OF 
CONST.  L.  102, 113—114 (2014). 
 50. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v.  National Electricity Board (ENEL), 1964 E.C.R.  587–601. 
 51. More generally, the steps necessary for the establishment of an internal market have been 
advanced by Lord Cockfield in the White Paper on Completion of Internal Market.   See Completing 
the Internal Market, 85 COM 310 (1985). 
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integrity of integrated financial markets.  Following the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, the necessity for international and supranational efforts to 
ensure financial stability and curb systemic risk became evident, given that 
the decisions purely driven by national interests could compromise the 
stability of the single market.52  In pursuing this enlarged dimension of the 
common interest, the EU legal order has expanded to include financial stability 
as a central element; particularly for Member States adopting the common 
currency, which automatically join the Banking Union.  From the above it 
emerges that the common interest is a fluid concept that changes depending on 
the needs of community.   
 
i. Institutions Warranting the Existence of The Common 
Interest.    
 
Within this constitutional framework the Commission — first, as the 
Commission of the European Communities, then, as the European 
Commission — represents, in its own words, the ‘embodiment’ of the common 
interest.53  The Commission is thus conceived and designed as an institution 
that is divorced from the interests of individual Member States.  It has been 
noted that the notion of fonction publique européenne (European civil 
service) cites the administrative functions of the Commission above 
national politics and defines the authority under which its officers perform 
their duties and tasks.54  This role and identity derives directly from EU 
primary law and it has been reaffirmed with the Lisbon Treaty.  The 
Commission is expected to be a guardian, by overseeing the correct and 
harmonious application of European law across the EU55 and by acting as 
both the police and the prosecutor of the Union.56  It also acts as a 
gatekeeper by channeling the interests of different groups into legislative 
proposals that are (or should be) in line with the common interest of the 
 
 52. For instance, in the context of the resolution of large, cross-border financial institutions 
Rosa M. Lastra, Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability 6 CAP.  MARKETS L. J.  197 (2011); 
Dirk Schoenmaker, Banking Supervision and Resolution: The European Dimension 6 L. & FIN.  
MARKETS REV.  52 (2012). 
 53. European Commission, The European Commission: 1995-2000, 7 (DGX, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities 1995). 
 54. CRIS SHORE, BUILDING EUROPE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 178 
(Routledge 2013). 
 55. Treaty of Lisbon art.  17, Dec. 18, 2007 [2009]. 
 56. See R. Schütze, European Constitutional Law 194 (2d ed., Cambridge University Press 
2016).   The Commission’s role of main protector of the Union notably emerges from its ability of 
commencing infringement procedures against Member States (TFEU, supra note 15, at art. 258,) 
and other EU Institutions (TFEU, supra note 15, at art. 263). 
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Union.57  Moreover, the Commission enjoys quasi-legislative and policy-
setting powers that define the contents of the common interest; albeit, it has 
direct legislative powers only on specific fields related to the protection of 
the common interest,58 as further illustrated below.   
The multifaceted and evolving nature of the common interest is also 
reflected in the evolution of European primary law.  In particular, by virtue 
of the Maastricht Treaty,59 the Community’s interest expanded with the 
inclusion of “economic and monetary union” — immediately after the 
reference to the “common market” — amongst the objectives of the 
Community enumerated in EC Treaty, Article 2.60  Such an addition 
resulted in two major consequences.  First, it expanded the role of the 
Commission in new areas and, second, offered the constitutional ground, 
also in the core objectives of the Community for establishing the European 
System of Central Banks, chaired by a supranational central bank.  The 
need for a European central bank became apparent precisely with the 
decision to move towards a monetary union.  The ECB hence came into 
existence in 1998 and assumed its formal functions starting January 1, 
1999, when the euro was introduced as common currency.  The process 
appears a natural development when the emergence of national central 
banks is considered.  In the 17th Century, starting with the Swedish 
Riksbank and the Bank of England,61 national central banks emerged in 
Europe to regulate money supply.  Their role and structure evolved from 
purely private institutions to entities performing a public function.  Once 
embedded in the legal, or even constitutional framework, central banks 
traditionally discharged their tasks through higher degrees of institutional 
autonomy and independence from political powers.62  
Within the European context, the establishment of the ECB as an 
autonomous body protecting the interest of the monetary union was 
ambiguous.  First, the Maastricht Treaty included the provisions on 
 
 57. DAMIAN CHALMERS ET  AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW, 72 (Cambridge University Press, 3d ed., 2014). 
 58. Specifically, the Commission may take directives or decisions to Member States to ensure 
that public undertakings are compliant with the provisions of the TFEU, supra note 15, at art.  106(3), 
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 59. The Treaty of Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992, established the European Union and substantially 
amended the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.  25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.  
11, as amended by Single European Act. 
 60. Treaty of Rome as reported in Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Oct. 11, 1997, C 340 P.  0173 O.J. [Hereafter EC Treaty]. 
 61. Founded, respectively, in 1664 and in 1694.   
 62. Rosa M.  Lastra, The Evolution of the European Central Banki, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1260 
(2012). 
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monetary and economic union within the EC Treaty, rather than in separate 
protocols or pillars, like the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs.63 This signaled an expansion of 
the scope of the common interest to cover deeper levels of integration.  
Second, a new constitutional balance resulted, whereby the Commission 
and other institutions, such as the European Court of Justice, extended their 
roles to cover new domains, e.g., by ensuring judicial reviews over ECB’s 
decisions.64  Third, notwithstanding the fact that monetary and economic 
union are key constitutional objectives, the ECB had an unclear constitutional 
status, given that it was not included the pantheon of the Community’s 
institutions.  Its existence was provided by EC Treaty, Article 8, which was 
separated from the provisions concerning other institutions.   
Such an ambiguity became evident in, and to some extent resolved by, 
the OLAF case.65  The ECB, in rejecting to be subjected to the 
Commission’s review, claimed to enjoy a legal personality and autonomy 
that should have been considered distinct from those attributed to the other 
Community institutions.  The Court, largely following the Advocate 
General’s opinion, rejected this view, stating that the ECB, in discharging 
its task of maintaining price stability, supports the general economic policy 
of the European Community, thus should be subjected to its rule of law 
even while enjoying a great degree of autonomy.66  As a result, even if the 
ECB performs its monetary policy to preserve the interest of the monetary 
union, and the euro, the principal guardian of the general Community’s 
interest, that includes the proper functioning of all its institutions, remains 
the Commission.    
The Lisbon Treaty reshaped the EU constitutional framework and 
deepened the notion of “union” to mark an intensified European 
integration.  The pervasiveness of European supranational structure and the 
idea of “community” was strengthened by building on established legal 
principles of European Law to further partition the interests of individual 
members from those of the community at large.  After the years spent in 
vain on the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty has marked a new 
ambitious step more reassuringly rooted in the acquis communautaire.  
 
 63. For an historical account, see DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN 
UNION, 240 (Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke 2004). 
 64. EC Treaty, supra note 60, at art.  230. 
 65. C-11/00 Commission v.  European Central Bank, 1999/726, 1991 E.C.R.  (EC). 
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and Monetary Union: Law and Institutions, 41 COMMON MKT.  L.  REV.  575 (2004); Rojer J.  
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Instead of announcing a global revision, the Lisbon Treaty relied on 
amendments to the acquis created by the Rome Treaty establishing the 
European Community and to the Maastricht Treaty establishing the 
European Union.  The duality between the European Union and the 
European Community collapsed into a renewed European Union.  Within 
this novel constitutional framework, whose implications affect the entire 
European political, economic, and legal spectrum,67 two elements are of 
particular relevance for our analysis.  First, the central role of the 
Commission in protecting the interest of the Union has been reaffirmed, by 
ensuring its monopoly of legislative initiative and by explicitly conferring 
executive powers to the Commission.  Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the 
Council exclusively held executive powers.  Second, the Lisbon Treaty 
clarified the role of the ECB, which gained new constitutional status.   
TEU Article 13(1) expressly identifies the ECB as one of the core 
institutions of the European Union.  ECB’s primary objective — laid down 
in TFEU Article 127(1) — is the pursuit of monetary stability.  This 
objective must be pursued without prejudice to the support of general EU 
economic policies and contribute to the achievement of the general EU 
interests and objective enshrined in Article 3 TEU.  In addition, the same 
article attributed to the ECB the general objective of contributing to the 
overall stability of the financial system and allowed the Council to delegate 
the supervision of the banking sector to the ECB.68  It is precisely upon these 
constitutional premises that the Banking Union was established.  This new 
architectural framework illustrates how the ECB participates in the coming 
into existence of a new governance function of the Union: the stability of the 
financial systems in the Eurozone,69 and the supervision of banking 
institutions via the Banking Union.   
The Commission and the ECB also enjoy a significant level of 
independence and autonomy.  TEU Article 17(3) and TFEU Article 245 
establish the independence of the Commission and the Commissioners who 
should not favor any specific country or body and should pursue the general 
interest of the Union.  Likewise, Article 130 TFEU ensures the independence 
of the ECB and of its governing organs while performing monetary policy 
functions.  Through TFEU Article 282(3), which refers to independence as 
an attribute of the powers granted to the ECB, independence is also 
 
 67. For a comprehensive review and analysis of the changes implemented with Treaty 
of Lisbon, see PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAW, POLITICS, AND TREATY REFORM 
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 68. TFEU, supra note 15, at art. 127(6). 
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extended to the newly acquired supervisory functions granted to the ECB 
within the SSM.70  
 
 ii.  Institutions Defining the Content of the Common Interest  
 
The definition of the contents of the common interest is reflected in 
the powers of EU institutions to adapt it, through policy-setting, rule-
making, interpretative efforts, to the mutating needs of various policy 
domains.  In other words, the common interest is not a static concept.  
Rather it is articulated in a series of specific legislative and regulatory 
activity that ensure the survival and, possibly, the thriving of the 
community.  The European Court of Justice is probably the most 
representative EU institution carrying out a constant interpretative activity 
to define the contents of the common interest.  In the context of financial 
regulation, the Commission appears as a key player in expanding the 
contours of the common interest and in defining its contents.    
Pursuant to TEU Article 17, “the Commission shall promote the general 
interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end” (emphasis 
added).  In discharging its legislative, quasi-legislative and executive roles, 
the Commission, other than being a guardian of the Union and its law, acts as an  
"engine” of both the European Union and integration process, through its 
prerogative of formally proposing legislative bills.71  The responsibility of 
initiating the policy-making process extends to setting the annual 
legislative program of the Union as well as stimulating the debate over 
reforms, usually via Green or White Papers.  The leading role of the 
Commission in defining the content of the Union’s common interest has 
gained intensity through the use of quasi-legislative powers supported by 
the “comitology” system.  The comitology system consists of specialized 
committees, composed of national administrators that assist the exercise of 
delegated legislative powers granted to the Commission.72  The wide use of 
 
 70. It was debated whether the independence of the ECB would extend also to the newly 
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comitology and delegated legislative powers has raised concerns over the 
democratic accountability of a quasi-legislative process pivoting around an 
unelected institution.73  
In the context of financial regulation, the Lamfalussy Process relied 
massively upon the comitology system with the objective, felt particularly 
strong before the Global Financial Crisis, of rapidly integrating national 
financial industries and markets.  Hence, if, on the one hand, the 
Lamfalussy Process redesigned the procedures of rule-making with a 
greater involvement of specialized committees, the Commission’s FSAP, 
on the other hand, provided the legal contents deemed necessary to 
establish an integrated market for financial services.  To this end, a high 
level of detail has characterized the measures contained in the FSAP.  The 
traditional distinction between regulations and directives blurred with the 
progressive abandonment of the minimum harmonization approach – 
according to which EU law only establishes minimum standards leaving to 
Member States the possibility to add new rules in the transposition process 
— in favor of a more pronounced reliance on maximum harmonization, 
according to which Member States are expressly prevented from adopting 
additional rules.74  Within this framework, the centrality of the Commission 
emerges distinctively in defining the contents of financial regulation, and 
thereby articulating the elements of the common interest.   
After the completion of the FSAP and with the entrance into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 — which coincidentally also marked the post-
financial crisis phase of EU financial regulation — a new definition of the 
common interest emerged.  As earlier noted, the necessity of enacting 
measures to support the creation of a single market mutated into the  
necessity of ensuring its integrity by preserving financial stability .  
This led to the establishment of the Banking Union, of which the 
Commission was the primary promoter.   
The establishment of a Banking Union, within the European 
Union — aimed at defining a more centralized apparatus in response to 
current and, possibly, future financial crises —became a part of the 
Commission’s agenda towards deeper economic and monetary 
integration.  Central to the Banking Union is the Single Rulebook, 
which is a set of substantive rules that builds upon and expands the 
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measures implemented through the FSAP.  New capital requirements,75 
harmonized provisions for deposit guarantee schemes,76 and common 
rules for recovery and resolution of troubled banking institutions77 
represent the major novelties in the bulk of EU substantive laws that are 
applicable to all credit institutions operating in all Member States.78  It 
has been noted that, rather than a cohesive set of legislative provisions, 
the Single Rulebook encompasses a number of measures including 
legislative, nonlegislative and implementing acts.79  This is potentially in 
conflict with the higher level of centralization sought through the new 
institutional structure and prompted distinguished commentators to question 
the appropriateness of the term “single rulebook”80 and to highlight the need 
for enhanced enforcement mechanisms and approaches.81  
 
iii.  Institutions Ensuring The Operation of The Common 
Interest  
 
The safeguard and the definition of the contents common interest 
percolate from EU primary laws to secondary legislative acts and 
ultimately to the administrative mechanisms that allows the enactment and the 
enforcement of EU law across the legal systems of its Members States.  It is 
precisely the institutional framework enacting regulatory and administrative 
provisions that locates a general, programmatic objective and puts it into 
operation.  In the general context of EU financial regulation, this function 
appears to be primarily performed by non-Treaty institutions, namely the 
ESAs, with a resulting dilution of the pursuit of a common interest with the 
interests of individual Member States.  Such a structure is anchored to the 
constitutional fabric of EU law that in turn is stretched to create a peculiar 
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architectural framework for financial regulation and supervision.    
The ESAs (and the ESRB) acquire their legal personality from TFEU 
Article 114 .  Article 114 stipulates that the European Parliament and Council 
may take required measures for the approximation of the provisions contained 
in law, regulation, or administrative action of Member States “which have as 
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.”  
Through the interpretation of Article 114 TFEU offered by the European 
Court of Justice and defining the Meroni doctrine on the establishment of 
new European authorities,82 the three ESAs and the ESRB are soft-law 
bodies;83 or, to use the EU law terminology, they are measures for the 
approximation of national laws.  The ESAs define Regulatory Technical 
Standards and Implementing Technical Standards.  They also oversee the 
correct implementation and application of EU laws and may intervene in case 
of emergency.  Their legitimacy in conducting rule-making activity is ascribed 
to the provisions of the Treaty governing the exercise of the quasi-legislative 
powers attributed to the Commission, specifically TFEU Articles 290 and 291.  
Hence, when secondary legislative acts entrust the Commission with the power 
to enact a delegated act pursuant to TFEU Article 290, the ESAs draft these 
acts in the form of Regulatory Technical Standards.  These standards are 
then endorsed by the Commission and subjected to the possibility of veto 
by the Council and the Parliament, as established by the same article.  Also, 
in the case of implementing acts, pursuant to TFEU Article 291, the ESAs 
draft these acts in the form of Implementing Technical Standards, subject 
to the procedures and control contained in that norm.  In both instances, the 
Commission has limited room to amend those acts or reject them, thus 
restricting its role to an activity of oversight on the legality of technical 
standards and their conformity with the general interest of the Union.  
Furthermore, albeit the Treaty does not contain an explicit possibility for 
delegating directly to the ESAs, it is not uncommon for the provisions of 
the Single Rulebook, composed of regulations enacted by the Council or by 
Parliament, to confer on the ESAs delegated powers.84  In this respect, the 
EBA represents the guardian of regulatory convergence and the keeper of 
the Single Rulebook of which defines its contents and, in principle, gives it 
a sense of cohesiveness.85  
 
 82. Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche s.p.a v. High Authority, 1957-1958, 
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The amplitude and the pervasiveness of the powers allocated to the 
ESAs emerge from a recent case, where the UK sought before the Court of 
Justice the annulment of the provision,86 contained in Article 28 of 
Regulation 236/2012 regulating short-selling operations.87  That regulation 
granted the ESMA the power of adopting legally binding measures in the event 
of a threat to the stability or the orderly functioning of the EU financial system.  
According to the applicant, TFEU Article 114 was not the appropriate legal 
basis for this delegation of powers and was at odds with the constitutional 
imbalances of the EU.  Moreover, the UK sustained that the Parliament and the 
Council do not have any authority under the EU primary law to delegate 
powers to a EU body, whose amplitude was deemed to violate the limits set 
by the Meroni doctrine.  The Court rejected the request of annulment and 
noted that the powers conferred to the ESMA are sufficiently restricted and 
are thus in conformity with the principles established in Meroni.  The Court 
further noted that the powers follow a regulatory logic that requires temporary 
restrictions, confined to emergency circumstances threatening the integrity of 
the single market.  Furthermore, consultation with other relevant EU 
institutions is required and ESMA’s acts may be challenged through judicial 
review, given that the Lisbon Treaty explicitly permits judicial review of 
acts of EU agencies and other bodies.  This judicial review implies the 
possibility a conferral of powers outside the perimeters of delegated 
legislation established by Articles 290 and 291.88  The Court also stated 
that those binding measures are devices to ensure further coordination and 
approximation of national laws, given that the addressees are markets’ 
participants, only in circumscribed circumstances, when ESMA represents 
a regulator of “last resort.”89  
The expanded role of nontreaty based institutions exemplifies the rise 
of the administrative Union,90 whereby governmental tasks are transferred 
to bodies not expressly mentioned in the constitutional design.  In the post-
Lisbon settlement, the comitology system has been substituted by a system 
of “agencies,” where national representatives are asked to enact the 
 
 86. Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v.  European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2014 Grand Chamber (EU) [hearinafter UK v.  
European Parliament and Council]. 
 87. Council Regulation No.  236/2012, 2012, O.J.  (L86/1) (EU). 
 88. Under Article 263 of the TFEU, acts of “bodies, offices” and “agencies” of the Union may be 
subject to judicial review by the Court.   The rules governing actions for failure are also applicable 
pursuant to Article 265.   Furthermore, courts and tribunals of the Member States may refer questions 
over the validity and the interpretation of those acts in accordance to Article 267.   Finally, such acts are 
subject to Article 277 governing the pleas of illegality. 
 89. UK v.  European Parliament and Council, supra note 86, at para 108. 
 90. Cf.  Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV.  L.  REV.  1231 (1994). 
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common interest of the Union.  The decision-making process, thus, follows 
a logic — and, as further elaborated below, a relational dynamic — that is 
different from the one adopted by supranational, Treaty-based institutions 
governed by EU civil servants to advance, or even embody, the common 
interest.  Albeit it has been argued that the ESAs are structurally 
intergovernmental91 and that the national interests are naturally embedded 
in the decision-making process of the ESAs.  In fact, their governing 
organs follow the (simple or qualified) majority voting rule, as does, for 
instance, the Council, the EU political institution par excellence.92 
The establishment of a Banking Union also had an impact on the role 
performed by treaty-based and non treaty-based institutions (and national 
authorities) to operate the common interest.  As noted earlier, banking 
supervision occurs through a single supervisory mechanism, i.e., the SSM, 
which is composed of the ECB and national authorities.  TFEU Article 
127(6)  de facto and de jure mandates the advancement of the common 
interest to a Treaty-based institution, i.e., the ECB.  However, the ECB is 
subjected to the rules drafted by the EBA and to a large extent enforcement 
is conducted by national authorities and coordination ensured through Joint 
Supervisory Teams.  In fact, the SSM operates on the basis of a mix of EU 
and national legislations;93 thus if a sufficient level of harmonization is not 
reached the application of EU laws may be impaired.94 Harmonization is, in 
principle, ensured by the Single Rulebook and by the implementing and 
delegated standards of the EBA.  Nonetheless, national authorities, in 
exercising their supervisory tasks, may adopt different approaches and 
enforcement strategies, potentially undermining the uniformity sought through 
the implementation of common rules.95  All in all, within the Banking Union 
the multilevel governance may be summarized as follows:  
 
i.) Two Treaty-based authorities are involved in the regulatory 
governance of the EU banking sector.  The Commission in 
 
 91. Niamh Moloney, The European Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for 
the EU Financial Market A- Tale of Two Competences: Part (1) Rule-Making, 12 EUR.  BUS.  ORG.  L.  
REV.  41, 77 (2011). 
 92. PAUL CRAIG, COMITOLOGY, RULEMAKING AND THE LISBON SETTLEMENT: TENSIONS AND 
STRAINS, RULEMAKING BY THE COMMISSION: THE NEW SYSTEM, (Carl Bergstrom & Dominique 
Ritleng, Oxford University Press (2015). 
 93. See, e.g., European Central Bank Regulation, Art.  4(3), 9(1), 18(5), and 21(4). 
 94. A problem noted by many.   See, e.g., Andrea Enria, European Central Authority Chairman, 
The New Role of the European Banking Authority in the Banking Union, ESE Conference in 
Frankfurt, (2013). 
 95. See Valia Babis, Single Rulebook for Prudential Regulation of Banks: Mission 
Accomplished? 26 EUR.  BUS.  L.  REV.  779 (2015); Singh, supra note 81.  
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exercising policy-setting and quasi-legislative powers (within 
the limits just illustrated) ensures both the advancement of the 
common interests and the definition of its contents.  The ECB 
oversees monetary stability and discharges its newly acquired 
supervisory functions towards banking institutions operating 
in the Banking Union.  In so doing, the ECB also safeguards 
the common interest while defining its contents. 
 
ii.)  Soft-law bodies, i.e.  the ESAs and the ESRB, put into 
operation the common interest, by defining technical 
standards, and ensuring regulatory and supervisory 
convergence both within and outside the Banking Union.  In 
particular, the EBA and the ESMA, albeit composed of 
national representatives, should exercise their powers in line 
with the interest of the EU. 
 
iii.) Network-based systems, i.e.  Joint Supervisory Teams, ensure 
the daily supervision and coordination among national 
authorities that, by definition, pursue national interests, but, in 
applying common rules, should also operate for the 
realization of the common interest. 
 
The resulting framework appears to be complex with different decision-
making centers.  Their structures, procedures, and organizations might 
generate new policy conflicts or  deeper fragmentation.  In particular, the role 
of the ESAs and their constitutional configuration pose three critical issues.  
First, in this schema, the ECB discharges its newly acquired — yet 
enshrined in the Treaty — supervisory duties in line with its general 
function of protecting the interest of the monetary union.  In operating this 
interest, the ECB will apply technical standards (regulatory or 
implementing) that have been drafted by an institution not established by 
the Treaty, i.e., the EBA, and whose new institutional capacity may 
potentially adumbrate the role of treaty-based institutions.  Second, the risk 
of the EBA to be politicized, as noted also by the International Monetary 
Fund, may ultimately undermine the effective operability of the Banking 
Union.96  Third and related, the membership of the EBA extends to all EU 
countries, bringing together Member States participating in the Banking 
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Union and Member States outside that arrangement.    
The overlaps of different national and supranational interests, 
canvassed in an institutional framework that does not sufficiently 
counteract the risk of politicization and with dubious constitutional 
contours, may affect the relationship among Member States, in particular 
between those that are subjected to the Banking Union and those that do 
not participate in it and have not adopted the single currency.  The first 
group of countries may see the EBA as a forum where undue pressures may 
be exercised towards the ECB, undermining its constitutional prerogatives.  
The second group, instead, may see in the new supervisory role of the ECB 
as a curtailment of their powers to influence the regulatory governance of 
the EU through their participation in the EBA.  For instance, the EU Sub-
Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs of the House of Lords, 
chaired by Lord Harrison, remarked in a report on the Banking Union that 
the SSM, by allocating new powers to the ECB may undermine the 
authority of the EBA.97  The EBA Chairman Enria has also highlighted that 
a chasm in the single market might emerge, given that Member States 
within and outside the SSM jurisdiction are driven by different priorities.98  
In this respect, it appears that the primary role of the EBA in the years to 
come will be to ensure a link between countries that are participating in the 
Banking Union and those that are not, by offering an interpretation of the Single 
Rulebook and ensuring coordinated supervision.99  Further convergence in the 
regulatory framework and in supervisory practices affecting all EU members 
appears to be the primary way forward to minimize the risk of a two-speed 
financial market within the EU.   
These issues are approached as phenomena related to the relational 
dynamics among the individuals participating in the decision-making 
process of the relevant EU institutions involved in the regulation and 
supervision of financial markets.  These relational dynamics are here 
examined through the lenses of social psychology that allows identifying the 
primary forms of sociality underpinning the governance process.  To this 
aim, it is necessary to determine how the EU constitutional framework 
shapes the relational dynamics within the institutions here considered.  This 
analysis will assist in elucidating the depth of the concerns animating the 
current debate over the institutional design for financial markets governance 
in the EU.    
 
 97. EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: KEY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES, 2012, H.L.  Paper 88, at 28. 
 98. Andrea Enria, Chairman of EBA, Challenges for the Future of EU Banking, Speech made at 
Madrid 3d Financial Meeting, Jan.  2015. 
 99. Eilís Ferran, The Existential Search of the European Banking Authority, EUR.  BUS.  ORG.  L.  
REV.  1 (2016). 
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III.  Forms of Sociality in EU Financial Regulation 
 
Studies in the field of social psychology and anthropology highlight 
that relational structures call for specific decision making processes, group 
dynamic, and governing values.  These structures are defined by four 
fundamental relational models, or forms of sociality, which characterize 
every group and may coexist within the same group of individuals.100  In 
Fiske’s words, all “domains and aspects of social relations may be 
organized by combinations of just four elementary models (schemata, rules, 
or grammars): communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, 
and market pricing”101  Identifying the sociopsychological models at play 
within a given institution enables us to better understand how this institution 
works.  To this purpose, the typology presented in the previous section elicits 
the core legal components that, by setting the premises for a collective action, 
contribute to the definition of a specific socio-psychological (or relational) 
model and, therefore, to a predictable operating mode also.   
Of particular relevance in any collective structure is the prominence 
given to a shared objective that could be more or less detached to the 
interests of its individual members.  In the context of financial regulation, 
and EU institutions in general, this is well represented by the identification 
of a common (European) interest.  EU Institutions that perform different 
functions, for instance, by advancing and defining the contents of the common 
interests, are expected to display more than one relational model, which adds 
to the complexity of the multilayer governance model.  Before advancing an 
analysis of the sociopsychological models characterizing EU financial 
regulators, it is worth introducing the four elementary forms of sociality. 
 
 A.  Elementary Forms of Sociality 
 
The theory of social relations identifies four relational models that 
characterize any social interaction in every culture.102 Combinations 
between these four models build various social forms in accordance to the 
contingent cultural framework.  Hence, through these lenses the social 
dimension of interactions among individuals is understood as a process that 
involves “seeking, making, sustaining, repairing, adjusting, judging, 
construing, and sanctioning relationships.”103  The four models — i.e.  Market 
 
 100. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16. 
 101. Id. at 690. 
 102. Id. at 689. 
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Pricing (MP), Equality, Matching (EM), Communal Sharing (CS), and 
Authority Ranking (AR) — operate in all domains of social action and 
cognition, such as transfer of property, definition of standards of conduct, 
group decisions, or organization of labor.  The core characteristics for each 
of these relational modes are briefly presented here, drawing primarily from 
Fiske’s unified understanding of the theory of social relations. 
Market Pricing represents the most pervasive mode of sociality in 
Western cultures.104 Within this form of sociality, relationships among 
individuals are based on more or less rational calculations of cost-and-
benefit ratios and proceed by self-interested exchange.  An illustration of 
the decision mechanism that is at play in MP is provided by Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand of the market.  Market prices or exchange rates are means to 
facilitate trade, whereby individuals aim at maximizing their idiosyncratic 
values through a transaction.  The voluntary nature of an arrangement is 
considered as a source of legitimacy and the rationality postulate is often 
assumed.  While rationality is not a necessary element, MP may, in fact, 
characterize a relational arrangement even if choices are not considered 
rational.  Other than price and exchange mechanisms, MP represents a 
driving force that can guide coordinated action towards a general goal, as 
long as the goal is pursued through voluntary actions that imply a 
calculative attitude.  For example, in a hiring process, the establishment of 
specific criteria, such as the level of formal education, relies on the value 
that — depending on the social and cultural context considered — is 
attributed to such criteria.  Hence, defined parameters and agreed criteria 
are necessary, as are prices, to relational dynamics responding to the MP 
logic.  Groups operating (primarily) under this mode, require explicit rules, 
usually formally stated, to guide their decisions and allow a cost-benefit 
analysis.  In this model, justifications for the actions taken often rely on a 
utilitarian and individualistic logic that is deemed to put forward the 
advancement of the general interest.  This is, for instance, the rationale 
underlying the General Equilibrium Theory, according to which the 
interactions amongst multiple, profit-seeking individuals lead to a point of 
market equilibrium and, thus, to the maximization of the general welfare.105  
Albeit MP is the most common relational mode, it is not the only mode of 
relating to others in Western cultures.106  The three other modes are also 
present, though in more subtle ways, precisely because the rules governing 
 
 104. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16 at 706. 
 105. Kenneth J.  Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive 
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social interactions remain (often) implicit.   
In the Equality Matching mode of relation,107 exchange is also central.  
Exchange is so central that some authors conflate EM and MP under the 
general label of “exchange relationships.”108  However, in comparison to 
MP, EM presents a distinctive focus on ensuring an even balance: Each 
member of the group is entitled to the same amount pursuant to egalitarian 
and distributive justice principles.  In this schema, any imbalance can be 
accounted for through the principles of equality and reciprocity.  Empirical 
studies highlighted a distinct tendency of punishing individuals whose 
actions, not obliging to general principles of reciprocity and equality, were 
deemed unfair.  In particular, when the participants to an experiment were 
asked to share a fixed sum with anonymous strangers, identified only by the 
distribution they had proposed in a previous round, the large majority opted 
to share the amount evenly only with those unknown individuals who had 
previously shared their sum evenly.109  Rawls’ theory of justice provides, 
with its notorious reference to the “veil of ignorance,” an illustration of the 
ethical dynamics underlying EM.110  In fact, the veil of ignorance is a 
thought experiment according to which rulers would not know the role that 
they will play in a world where they are called to determine the rules.  
Under relational models governed through equality a balanced distribution of 
resources is incentivized, making no share worse than the others.111  EM 
involves distinct individuals who are considered and respected as equals and 
whose differences are acknowledged and assessed to reach an optimal point, 
which is represented by an even balance. 
In Communal Sharing relationships,112 members of a group consider 
each other as of the same kind, as belonging to a single group, or as sharing 
a common identity.  Communal relationships are characterized by mutual 
feelings of responsibility for the well-being of other members and of the 
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group as a whole; benefits and concessions are given in response to the 
needs of the others without expectation of repayment.  By contrast, in 
“exchange relationships,” intended as both MP and EM, benefits are given 
in response to specific benefits received in the past or with the expectation 
to receive benefits in the future.113 While CS is typical of family, romantic 
or friendly relationships, the exchange relationships are found more often 
among strangers or business associates.  Ethnographic research revealed 
that CS is also a basis for constituting sociality in stateless, food-harvesting 
societies, where ethnical, familial, and religious elements are the main 
bonds (or group norm) that create and maintain a community.114 In modern 
societies, CS manifests as the cooperative attitude towards a common 
objective deployed by individuals within groups and institutions and relates 
to the concept of organizational identity, according to which members of 
an organization, including public authorities, share an understanding of 
what characterizes their organization as distinctive and drives their 
collective enterprise.115  Within this framework, members of a group 
identify themselves under a common denominator — be it an ideology, a 
shared identity, a cultural element, a mission, or a common interest — and 
tend to change their behaviors to conform to the behaviors of the others.116   
In larger communities, CS is also present.  Stereotyped repetitive 
actions, traditions, building of rituals, and general principles sustain group 
membership and cohesion.  There is often an idealization of a general social 
norm that keeps the individuals of a group together under the ordering 
principles of consensus, unity, and conformity.  Upon this idealized social 
norm — that glues the group to a common goal — develops the tendency of 
the group to take actions that preserve and perpetuate its very existence.  The 
existence of conflict is not uncommon in CS and it limits the risk of 
groupthink, which is a psychological phenomenon that occurs when 
members of a group or a community, in order to avoid conflicts, impede 
critical thinking.117 This may result in a dysfunctional decision-making 
outcome, because the evidence challenging group’s assumptions and 
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supporting a specific action is uncritically discarded.118  
Finally, Authority Ranking relationships reflect a hierarchy between 
people who are ordered in a linear manner.119  In AR, individuals are either 
above or below each other, depending on the social status attributed in a 
specific context.  Higher ranked individuals enjoy prestige, prerogatives, and 
privileges that those in a lower position do not have.  Military ranks are 
epitomic of this relational model, which predominantly govern the 
interactions between individuals working in the armed forces.  There is a 
stark difference with the relational organization encountered in both CS 
and EM.  In AR, resources are allocated depending on the ranking of 
individuals instead of being traded, equally distributed, or pooled.  When 
AR features the decision-making process of a given group, information 
moves upward towards the leader who, after assessing them, passes 
decisions down through a chain of command.  This dynamic has been 
observed in situations where individuals emulate, obey, or even worship 
superiors,120 but also in the political sphere, where the phenomenon has 
been referred to as “authoritative democracy.”121  As noted by Weber, a 
hierarchical organization could be imposed through coercion and unilateral 
control of resources, but it may be accepted through a process of 
ideological validation that recognizes and legitimizes a superior 
authority.122  Ultimately, as noted by Freud, it may also spontaneously arise 
within a group, when emulation of and identification with the leader 
generate herd behaviors.123  In any cases, individuals in AR groups acquire 
a sense of self-identity from knowing their place in the hierarchy.124 
The four models often coexist and a group or an institution that 
operates according only to one model appears to be a rare occurrence.  A 
combination of the models is more commonly observed in different aspects 
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of the social interaction.  For instance, different social models may be 
unconsciously used as templates to interpret the positions of other 
individuals in the group, to judge or anticipate others’ actions, and 
ultimately to engage in coordinated enterprises, or sabotage them.  In this 
respect, Fiske observes that the models are used together in a hierarchical 
fashion through various phases of a social interaction or in distinct 
activities within an institution.125 Albeit there is limited empirical evidence 
on the specific driving elements determining what makes a group of 
individuals opt for one of the models, or to switch from one model to the 
next, it is reckoned that there is a consensus among individuals of a group 
in identifying which form of interaction should be used in any given 
circumstance.126  In other words, there are cultural and contextual rules that 
are shared among members of a group and that drive individuals in 
adopting one of the four relational models interactions.  Drawing from 
these observations it is possible to identify within the legal context of EU 
financial regulators the dominant relational rules that underpin the 
decision-making process of the considered EU bodies.    
 
B. Models of Sociality in the Financial Regulation Framework 
 
A distinct socio-psychological model is implicitly favored by the legal 
framework for each one of the three categories of EU institutions we 
isolated in the typology presented in Part II.  The specific modus operandi 
and the regulatory outcomes of EU institutions, is rooted in the 
constitutional fabric of the EU.  The allocation of powers, objectives, 
duties, and tasks defines, together with the procedures regulating the 
members’ appointment and their collective decision-making, a main 
relational style for each category.  More specifically, the following patterns 
are observable: Communal Sharing is a dominant mode for institutions 
engaged in recognizing the existence of the common interest; whereas 
Equality Matching and Market Pricing are dominant for institutions 
defining the content of the common interest, under the principles of mutual 
recognition, and for institutions operating the common interest, where 
regulatory and supervisory convergence occur through a balancing of the 
interests of the community as a whole, with national and industry’s 
interests.  By contrast, due to the very nature of the EU legal framework, 
Authority Ranking does not appear to be a dominant relational model in 
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any of the three categories elicited.  This is not to say that there is not a 
hierarchical organization in the EU legal order (or within its institutions); it 
rather means that the linear ordering is minimal when the decision-making 
organs driving regulatory and supervisory activities are observed.  
However, it may be more pronounced in intra-institutional domains that 
rest outside the scope of this analysis.    
To shift the focus from the general categories to the relational modes 
of specific regulators, EU institutions are here considered as groups of 
individuals that organize themselves in collective structures, where the 
achievement of one’s activity may only occur if other individuals perform 
another task or activity.127  With the intent of isolating the relational 
dynamics within the various collective structures engaged with the 
governance of financial markets, the distinction between treaty-based 
institutions and the other bodies appears to be particularly salient.  The 
Commission and the ECB are key treaty-based institutions in the new 
European financial regulatory framework.  Their activities and roles, as 
regulators and supervisors, are defined within the constitutional provisions 
contained in EU primary law.128  Alongside these institutions operate a 
series of nontreaty—based institutions, i.e., the ESAs, the ESRB and 
different network-based structures to coordinate the activities of national 
authorities.  It is worth highlighting that all EU institutions ultimately 
concur in shaping the European financial regulatory space.  The Court of 
Justice, as earlier illustrated, has been called on to define the status of the 
ECB, before the Lisbon Treaty, and the powers of the ESAs; the Council 
represents the political forum where the regulatory policy agenda is set; and 
the European Parliament holds key legislative functions approving or 
putting a veto, for instance, on delegated legislative acts.  New links are 
also emerging, with the increasing practice of delegating and conferring 
powers to the ESAs.  It is clear that an analysis over the complex nexus of 
legal and administrative procedures among these institutions would require 
a detailed treatise that is beyond the scope of this work.  This analysis, 
instead, focuses on the relational arrangements within the EBA, the 
Commission and the ECB. 
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Upon the basic distinction between treaty-based and nontreaty— 
based institutions it is already possible to isolate the primary forms of 
sociality characterizing EU institutions involved in financial regulation.  As 
the dynamics of any group of individuals, from families to companies, may 
follow different form of sociality, so more than one form of sociality may 
characterize the political, organizational and administrative activities of EU 
institutions, and of the Union at large.  Hence, EU treaty-based institutions 
appear to be engaging with the logics of two primary forms of sociality: 
communal sharing that is oriented towards the realization of the 
community’s interests, and equality matching that aims at ensuring a 
constant balance among Member States within these institutions.  This 
double (relational) dynamic reflects the duality of the function that EU 
treaty-based institutions perform vis-à-vis the common interest.  With 
regards to the ESAs their ambivalent — and recently acquired — roles lead 
to identify as primary form of sociality market pricing.  In order to fully 
appreciate the ramifications of this perspective, the governance of financial 
markets in the EU is examined by looking at the socio-psychological 
dimension that transpires from the EU constitutional framework.  The 
relational dynamics influencing the decision-making process of both treaty-
based and non-treaty based institutions in the context of EU financial 
regulation and supervision are then considered. 
 
i.  The Communal Sharing Form of Sociality and the EU               
Constitutional Framework 
 
In general, CS is a direct manifestation of the core features of the European 
project from its modern genesis.  Commentators have cogently noted that Van 
Gend en Loos contains a proclamation of authority of a post-national community 
whose attributes supersede those of nation-states and emanate from an idealized 
notion of “common interest” —contained in the EU primary law — to justify an 
increasingly larger scope of intervention.129  A different reading, one that may 
well complement the one just illustrated, could be offered if the idea of common 
interest is examined through the lenses of social psychology. 
As earlier noted, the idealization of a social norm constitutes precisely 
the core bond in CS.  Notwithstanding the reasons driving individuals to 
organize themselves within such a structure, the existence of a basic 
principle — referred to as “group norm” —represents one of the conditions 
of existence of a group.130 Individuals adhere to such a group norm that is 
 
 129. Chalmers & Barroso, supra note 49, at 105. 
 130. Allport, supra note 127, at 11. 
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generally flexible enough to adapt to new circumstances ensuring a 
constant reciprocal rewarding, which in this context refers to a reciprocal 
recognition of value among members participating within the same group.  
Such a psychological mechanism facilitates the functioning of the group even 
when individuals are not fully aware of the specific activities of other 
members, but they are necessarily aware that their contributions converge 
towards the common interest of the group.131  In focusing on the positions of 
individual Member States the point may be easily missed.  At the national level, 
in fact, the debate often focuses on national interests that, following the narrative 
of “limited sovereignty,”132 are in contrast to those pursued by EU institutions.  
When a group perspective is acquired to study the decision making process the 
idea of an underlying common interests emerges more distinctively. 
The presence of conflicts and opposing interests is an element that 
characterizes CS forms of sociality and may signal the lack of groupthink.  
For instance, it is in pursuit of a common interest that divergent positions 
converged into the establishment of a Banking Union, which requires 
pooling more resources and the abdication of more sovereign powers 
towards supranational authorities.  Germany advocated for a more limited 
authority for the ECB.  In particular, given that the German banking market 
is one of the less concentrated markets in the Eurozone, direct supervisory 
powers over small banks, such as the Sparkassen (savings banks), appeared 
as excessively intrusive to the German government.133  Similarly, the UK 
supported the creation of a Banking Union amongst Eurozone countries to 
strengthen the single market and ensure financial stability, albeit opposing 
to subjecting to it.  France, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands have 
advocated for greater ECB powers.134  Once these positions have been 
conciliated and a compromise (mostly political) has been reached, a 
 
 131. Allport, supra note 127 at 13—15. 
 132. In the UK, for instance, much of the discussion preceding the Brexit referendum 
was based on the idea that the EU limits the sovereignty of its Member States.  This position 
has been eloquently rebutted in a report of the European Institute of the London School of 
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club in those areas where sovereignty is shared or pooled.” Ever Closer Union Report of the 
Hearing Held on 15th April, 2016, at 18, LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in 
Europe, LSE European Institute, available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66958/1/Hearing-10---
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 133.  David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, The Steep Road to European Banking Union: 
Constructing the Single Resolution Mechanism, 52 J.  COMMON MKT.  L.  REV.  125, 130—131 
(2014). 
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unanimous consensus, is necessary under TFEU Article 127(6) to entrust 
the ECB with new powers and competencies.  
The general constitutional ethos, grounded on the concept of 
community supported by an idealized interest that is autonomous from the 
ones of its constituting members, is transposed to treaty-based institutions 
that are called on to represent such a community as a whole.  In particular, 
the ECB and the Commission, pursue the common interest, however 
intended, precisely through the realization of specified objectives that 
shape their regulatory and supervisory action.  The decision-making 
processes to attain these objectives occur under the logics of structured 
cooperation, which, as illustrated next, appears to be characterized by CS 
and EM forms of sociality. 
 
ii.  The Treaty-Based Institutions and Communal Sharing 
Form of Sociality 
 
Although the Commission and the ECB are based upon different legal 
grounds and have very different institutional settings to discharge their 
respective tasks, their key constitutional features are designed to ensure the 
pursuit of an interest that transcends the interests of the individual members 
participating in the EU legal community.  It follows that CS is one of the 
dominant forms of sociality within these institutions because this relational 
mode directly derives from the idea of Europe advanced by the Treaties.  
Within the groups of individuals governing these institutions, structural 
cooperation — whether it is created through legal mechanisms or anchored to 
an effective shared identity — is a necessary feature to both administer pooled 
resources and pursue the common interest by realizing the objectives mandated 
by the community.   
As earlier noted, the Commission acts as a guardian of and represents 
the community’s interest, to the point that it defines itself as the 
institutional embodiment the community;135 whereas the ECB preserves the 
stability of the Eurozone, in the common interest of its members.136  Their 
supranational status with extensive autonomy and independence separates 
them from the individual members and entitles them to manage resources 
that are pooled in the pursuit of a collective interest.  This process occurs 
through the principles of consensus, unity and conformity that characterize a 
decision-making structure based on CS,137 and manifests itself in the status of 
 
 135. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: 1995-2000, 7 (European Commission 1995). 
 136. Lastra, supra note 62, at 1260. 
 137. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 697. 
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their civil servants.  This determines a sense of the group in which individual 
positions are channeled through a collective commitment which, in the case 
of the Commission and the ECB, is precisely represented by the preservation 
of the integrity of the single market.  Also, in this case, the existence of 
different positions within these bodies does not contradict the CS mode; it 
rather represents an inherent phenomenon for decisions taken within a 
collective structure. 
 
iii.    The Treaty-Based Institutions and Equality Matching 
Form of   Sociality 
 
A closer look at the organizational structures and decision-making 
processes of the Commission and the ECB reveals that EM is also a 
characterizing the relational dynamics within their respective decision-
making organs, governed under the principle that distinct, but equal 
individuals acknowledge their differences to reach an even balance.138  The 
coexistence of CS and EM is not surprising as both the Commission and 
the ECB have a role in pursuing the common interest and in the definition 
of its contents.   
Other than being the guardian of the common interest, the 
Commission is also the engine of the Union, with its executive, policy-
setting, and quasi-legislative powers.  Pursuant to the grounding provisions 
establishing the Commission, it is composed of one Commissioner for each 
Member State,139 now twenty-eight Commissioners,140 with one President 
proposed by the European Council and elected by the Parliament.141  Under 
this framework, Commissioners constitutes the College of Commissioners, 
which makes all the decisions under the principle of “collegiality.”  Even if 
in practice there is little collegial discussion, any decision taken by the 
Commission is a collegial decision, to which Commissioners could 
contribute.142  However, this praxis has given rise to a host of well-known 
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concerns over the democratic accountability of the Commission and the 
politicization of its decision-making process within the College of 
Commissioners, where the collegiality principle remains, in most cases, a 
mere black letter.143  
The socio-psychological perspective sheds new light over these issues 
that are defined by specific behavioral patterns.  The decision-making 
structure of the Commission follows the principle one-person equals to 
one-vote within the College.  This indicates that the EM shapes the 
qualitative dimension of interpersonal relationships and operates as a 
mechanism for social influence.  It follows that when individuals receive a 
favor or a concession they feel obliged to reciprocate in order to ensure balance 
and equality among group members.144 This in turn may discourage formal 
discussions; questioning the decisions proposed by one or more 
Commissioners may be perceived to slowdown the realization of the 
Commission’s objectives, affecting the overall balance of interpersonal 
relationships.  To put it differently, this form of sociality, governed by 
reciprocity and equality, encourages exchanges and a, more or less explicit, 
bargaining process, that has been observed in the College of Commissioners.145  
Traditional game theory would explain this phenomenon as a repeated 
game, in which players know that a momentary concession will correspond 
to a “side payment” or compensation in the future.  Under this light, players 
aim at getting the best personal outcome and maximize their utility 
functions by making choices in consideration of any future compensation.  
Fiske’s models provide for a more sophisticated and, possibly, complete 
explanation.  The ultimate goal within an EM relational mode is the 
equilibrium of the entire social group.  As noted, such an end also 
encompasses considerations over the fairness and the equality of the outcomes 
— rather than being limited to the maximization of two (or more) players’ 
utility functions.  The activity of the group and its very existence is determined 
by such a tension towards an overall balance, where lack of reciprocity or a 
perceived unfairness could result in social sanctioning, given that they 
ultimately compromise the survival and the operability of the group.  Hence, 
what from an outsider’s viewpoint might be perceived as politicization based 
on a series of concessions, within the group, it is the essence of a structured 
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cooperation that justifies the existence of the group and its decisions.   
The EM relational mode can also be found in the ECB governing 
organs.  Within the ECB there are three decision-making organs, namely: i) 
the Governing Council, which is entrusted with the power of formulating 
monetary policy for the Eurozone, defining guidelines for national central 
banks operating in the European Central Banks System, and, under the 
newly established SSM, setting the general framework under which 
supervisory actions are conducted and objecting the decisions proposed by 
the Supervisory Board; ii) the Executive Board, whose role is to implement 
the guidelines established by the Governing Council and coordinates 
national central banks; and iii) the newly established Supervisory Board 
that coordinates the supervisory activities under the SSM.  The Supervisory 
Board is composed of eighteen country’s representatives plus a Chair, a 
Vice-Chair and four representatives of the ECB not involved in monetary 
tasks.  The aim is to create a Supervisory Board that is in line with the EU 
constitutional framework that attributes, under TFEU Article 127(6), 
supervisory functions to the ECB, and independent enough from the 
monetary policy tasks conducted by the ECB in order to avoid conflict of 
interests between banking supervision and monetary stability.146   
The Governing Council is the primary decision-making body and 
is composed of the governors of the national central banks that are a 
part of the Eurozone, plus the members of the Executive Board 
(President, Vice-President and four other independent individuals).147 
Governors shall not represent the interests of their country and they 
are members in their capacity as independent experts.  Members of the 
Board are independent and are appointed for eight years,148 which 
exceeds the terms of any national government as well as the terms of 
any other European institutions.  In order to avoid coalitions among 
Member States the Executive Board sets the agenda and, since 
Lithuania’s accession to the Eurozone as of 2015, the voting follows a 
rotating system capped at twenty-one voters.  Governors are allocated 
to different groups based on the size of their country’s economy and 
financial sector.  As long as the Eurozone has between eighteen and 
twenty-one participating countries there are two groups.  The five 
largest countries constitute the first group and they share a total of 
four voting rights that rotate monthly.149  Thus, every month one of the 
 
 146. A mediation mechanism has been also established, when the Governing Council 
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governors of the five largest countries would not vote, but may 
participate in the discussion.  The remaining governors share a total of 
eleven voting rights, which also rotate on a monthly basis .  The six 
members of the Executive Board are permanent voters.  This creates a 
system based on a collective decision-making process where one 
person is equal to one vote; although non-voting countries are 
determined through a frequency that changes depending on the 
dimension of the country.  Members of the Governing Council may 
predict when they will not vote, but they are naturally unaware of the 
decisions on which they will be asked to vote.  Hence, decisions are 
taken under what resembles a ‘veil of ignorance’ that sustains the EM 
form of relationship.150  
 
iv. Non-Treaty-Based Institutions and Market Pricing    
Form of Sociality  
 
The ESAs and the ESRB have been established under TFEU Article 
114, which allows treaty-based institutions to delegate specific task to ad 
hoc created authorities, as long as they are devices to serve the 
community’s interest of protecting the single market through the 
harmonization of EU law.  It follows that the ESAs and the ESRB are, from 
a constitutional perspective, means to achieve the general interest and, 
following the categorization offered in Part II, they operate the common 
interest by ensuring regulatory and supervisory convergence.   
We argue that these institutions, which are not included in the 
pantheon of EU institutions enshrined in the Treaties, operate mainly under 
the MP form of sociality.  We focus mainly on the example of the ESMA, 
which has broad powers.  It drafts technical standard, advances proposals, 
and issue ‘comply or explain’ notices, which hardens non-binding 
guidelines and recommendations that could be also adopted.151 ESMA 
shares common elements with EU agencies, including a strong reliance on 
technical expertise, legal personality, degree of independence, and 
procedures to be followed by its governing organ.152   
These features, together with ESMA’s broad powers, are of particular 
relevance to analyze the sociopsychological model of this institution.  
Whereas the treaty-based inter-institutional lawmaking process is designed 
 
 150. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 705. 
 151. ESMA Regulation, supra note 33, at art. 16. 
 152. For a thorough analysis over the mechanisms and the functioning of ESMA, see 
Moloney, supra note 91. 
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to produce high-level principles and is inspired in its dynamic by common 
ideals,153 administrative rule-making in the securities and markets sphere, 
produced with a major role of ESMA, is more technical and inspired by 
economic considerations.  This characteristic is likely to tip the culture at 
ESMA toward Market Pricing.  Overall, it can indeed be observed that 
securities and market regulation is primarily directed to the support of 
market efficiency, transparency and integrity as well as to the protection of 
consumers and investors.154  The traditional justification for regulatory 
intervention, in financial as well as other markets, relies on the idea that a 
regulatory intervention is necessary to correct market failures.155  Those are 
situations in which markets fail to reach an optimal equilibrium and, as a 
consequence, allocation of resources ceases to be efficient.  This may occur 
for various reasons.  For instance, when financial instruments may not be 
correctly priced by market participants due to asymmetric information, or 
when “the well-being of one economic agent (consumer or firm) is directly 
affected by the actions of another” that results in negative externalities.156  It 
also occurs when a diffused financial instability is generated by a market 
participant’s failure.  Following this rationale, a regulatory intervention is thus 
required and justified.  Conduct of business rules, consumers and investors 
protection standards as well as regulations affecting the governance of 
financial institutions, their solvability and possible failures are grounded on 
this rationale and necessarily impose a level of expertise to draft detailed 
provisions that are intended to correct markets’ imperfection, by steering 
the behaviors of financial entities while ensuring their economic viability.    
The hypothesis that an MP mode of sociality characterizes ESMA is 
further confirmed by the structure of the institution.  ESMA’s primary 
decision-making organ is the Board of Supervisors, composed of the heads 
of Member States’ supervisors, defined as National Competent Authorities 
(NCAs).  The Chairperson of ESMA sits on the Board and chairs the 
meeting, although with no voting right.  The Board also includes 
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representatives (with no voting rights) of: the Commission (as for any EU 
agency), the ESRB, EBA, and EIOPA.  With such a configuration, the 
Board combines the scientific expertise functions with political oversight, 
two functions that are usually separated.  The Board gives guidance to the 
work of ESMA, adopts opinions, recommendations, decisions and advice.  
The Board operates under a simple majority vote; each Board member has 
one voting right and they are all required not to advance the interest of their 
respective Member States.157  Alongside the Board of Supervisors, there is 
the Management Board which is composed of the Chairperson and six 
members of the Board of Supervisors.  The members of the Management 
Board are elected by the voting members of the Board of Supervisors.158 
Also in this case, the Commission and the Executive Director participate in 
meetings, but have no voting rights.159  The Management Board operates on a 
simple majority rule basis.  The Management Board has to propose for adoption 
by the Board of Supervisors an annual and multi-annual work program.  In 
addition, to facilitate consultation with stakeholders, ESMA has established a 
consultative Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (SMSG).160  It is consulted 
in practice by ESMA on various matters, including technical aspects.  The 
dialogue with stakeholders and experts evidences the importance granted to market 
participants in defining the rules through which financial markets may function.   
This description enables us to understand the double nature of ESMA, 
and the other two ESAs in general.161  First, it is a body in charge of 
building EU common rules and as such it should “protect the public interest 
by contributing to the [.  .  .] stability and effectiveness of the financial system, 
for the Union economy, its citizens and businesses.”162  Moreover, ESMA 
should act independently and autonomously “in the sole interest of the Union 
as a whole” without seeking instructions from other European institutions or 
from Member States.”163  In its 2011 annual report, ESMA identified the six 
characteristics as to how it achieves its mission and objectives: independently, 
cooperatively, with accountability, professionalism, and effectiveness.164  The 
identification of specific operational rules and guiding principles against which 
 
 157. ESMA Regulation, supra note 33, at art. 44(1). 
 158. Id. at art. 45(1). 
 159. Id. at art. 45(2); However, according to Article 45(3), the representative of the 
Commission has voting rights on matters related to the ESMA’s budget. 
 160. Id. at art. 37. 
 161. The provisions here analyzed are also contained in the regulations establishing the 
EBA and the EIOPA. 
 162. ESMA Regulation, supra note 33, at art. 1(5). 
 163. Id.  at art.  42 para 1. 
 164. European Securities and Markets Authority Annual Report 9, (2011).  
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ESMA regulatory activity is benchmarked points towards a prominence of 
a modus operandi characterized by an MP relational mode.   
Second, notwithstanding the intergovernmental ethos, representatives 
of NCAs on the Board of Supervisors are naturally incentivized to take into 
account, if not promote, their national positions.  In fact, ESMA’s resources 
are limited and its working model is dependent on NCAs resources.165  The 
pressure for adopting certain measures, and to allocate resources in a manner 
that is in line with national interests, ensures the necessity for a decision 
making process based on negotiation among the members of the Board, i.e.  
the representatives of NCAs.  The resulting organizational structure naturally 
leads to a bargaining culture that is a primary characteristic of MP, whereby 
motives based on the pursuit of individual interests may overbear the search 
for an overall balance.  This is further evidenced in some of the 
observations advanced in the 2013 Mazars ESA Review.166  The Review 
stressed the importance of reaching a balance between EU-wide and 
national interests.167  As earlier noted, similar considerations have been 
advanced towards another ESA, i.e.,  the EBA.  Also in this case, the socio-
psychological perspective advanced here reveals that bargaining is a natural 
manifestation of a group dynamic in which multiple individual interests are 
more prominent (and tangible) than the pursuit of an idealized common 
interest.  The problems related to the growing role of the ESA, hence, 
appear to reside in the compromise between the interests of Member States 
and those of the Union.  Absent an institution that represents the common 
interest also in the processes of regulatory and supervisory convergence, an 
“exchange relationship,” either based on EM or MP, is expected.   
 
IV. Regulators in Crisis: a Sociological and Psychological      
Perspective 
 
The relational models appear to be useful, not only to describe more 
accurately the dynamics driving the decision-making process of EU bodies 
involved in financial regulation; they also offer a conceptual framework 
that sheds light over the development of conflicts amongst Member States, 
or groups thereof, when their representatives participate in collective 
structures.  Conflicts appear to arise and be managed following specific 
behavioral patterns that can be ascribed to each dominant form of sociality.  
 
 165. ESMA Regulation, supra note 33, at art.  62(1). 
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This is to say that, for a given disruption in the expected relational dynamics 
within an institution, direct or indirect consequences within the group may be 
isolated.  For instance, if one or more members of the group characterized by 
the CS or the EM relational archetypes does not follow the appropriate group 
norm, other members of that group are likely to sanction them or the group 
is likely to fracture into sub-groups.  In this schema, it is assumed that the 
group continues to operate and the collective structure does not 
immediately cease to exist.   
In this respect, the current Brexit debate — preceding and following 
the result of the referendum of June 23, 2016, when the UK voted to leave 
the EU — offers a perfect case study to examine how different, and often 
antithetic, positions advanced by EU Member States influences the group 
dynamics operating within different EU institutions and bodies.168  At the 
time of writing (October 2016), the UK has signaled that it does not share 
the common interest upon which the Union is constructed.  As further 
elaborated below, this emerges not only from the result of the June 
referendum, it also transpires from the official talks preceding the public 
vote.   However, given that the formal withdrawal procedure enshrined in 
TEU Article 50 has not been activated, the UK is still a member of the 
Union.  Hence, the UK is still participating in most of the official meetings 
of the European Council and its representatives still hold positions in EU 
institutions, such as the Commission and the ESAs.  EU officials and 
governments of Member States have made clear on multiple occasions that 
no informal negotiation over the future UK-EU relationships will be held 
before the UK will formally notify its intentions of leaving; a possibility 
that seems likely to occur by the end of March 2017.169  From that moment, 
pursuant to TEU Article 50, there is a window of two years to define the 
UK-EU relationships, after which the UK will be effectively out of the 
Union, with or without a deal with the Union of twenty-seven countries.170  
In this context, while the Union still performs its tasks and functions 
relying on an institutional setting designed for twenty-eight countries, the 
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position of the representatives of the UK in different decision-making 
organs is peculiar.  A black-letter analysis of the constitutional framework 
governing the EU is not sufficiently equipped to grasp such a complex and 
uncertain political situation.171 In turn, by enriching the legal analysis with 
a socio-psychological perspective over the group dynamics within 
institutions provides a much deeper understanding of an unfolding debate 
that will have ripple effects in the years to come.    
 
A.        The Development of A Divide 
 
In general terms, the primary source of tension in EU institutions 
derives from the emergence and the consolidation of two groups of 
countries, notably Eurozone countries and non-Eurozone countries.  This 
divide may be observed in different instances ranging from the closed 
borders of a common monetary policy to reach critical aspects of financial 
regulation and crises resolution.  Within the EU, the interests of the 
Eurozone and those of the single markets are not necessarily aligned.  
Distinguished commentators have noted that the decisions taken to 
safeguard the former also have an impact on the latter, although the input 
of non-Eurozone countries in the decision-making process is limited, if not 
absent.172  This situation may be described as a misalignment within the 
various possible definitions of the contents of the common interest:  the 
recent financial, euro, and sovereign debt crises accentuated centrifugal 
forces potentially separating non-Eurozone countries from the rest of the 
Union.   
The inclusion of financial stability within the perimeters of the 
common interests is particularly pronounced for Member States that are 
taking part in the SSM.  The preservation of financial stability is 
constructed as deriving from the maintenance of the integrity of the single 
market.  However, the interconnection between the banking sector, 
sovereign debts, monetary policy, and the single currency required 
Eurozone countries to design responses that are tailored to preserve the 
monetary union, mostly through further integration.  For Eurozone 
countries the primary concern has been to break the link between the 
banking sector and sovereign states, whereby public funds are required to 
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bail out troubled banks by deepening the national debts and compromising 
monetary stability.173  Hence, the establishment of the Banking Union has 
strengthened supervisory convergence through an increased attribution of 
powers at the supranational level.  Drawing from the relational archetypes 
and with reference to the three main layers that posit EU institutions at 
different distances from the common interests, it is possible to examine how 
this divide within the Union affects the decision-making process and, more 
generally, the relational dynamics within institutions.   
When CS operates, there is equality among members, which are units 
with the same weight and not ranked or organized under a hierarchical 
structure.  As a result, the decisions made are unitary, in the sense that they 
represent the whole rather than the result of bilateral bargaining.  This 
equivalence derives from a group norm that determines a sense of belonging 
towards the group or the community and, ultimately, legitimizes its very 
existence.174 Prolonged dissent may weaken the strength of the whole 
community in two intertwined fashions.  First, dissent shows a disagreement 
towards the group norm upon which the collective structure is established.  
This makes the participation into the group less rewarding and may 
ultimately lead one or more individuals to withdraw from the group.175  
Second, constant dissent leads to undermining the relational equivalence 
among members and signals a lack of sense of belonging.176  Hence, the 
principles of proportionality and equality among members of groups 
operating under EM relational modes also enter into crisis.  Within the 
European institutional framework earlier described, this means that if the 
existence of the common interest stipulated in the Treaties and justifying 
the existence of supranational apparatus is compromised, decision-making 
organs entrusted with the powers to define the contents of such a common 
interest are also compromised. 
The problem emerges clearly from the impact that the UK vote to leave the 
EU had immediately on the College of Commissioners.  The Commissioner for 
the UK, Lord Hill, held the crucial role of advancing the financial regulatory 
agenda of the Union, being Commissioner for Financial Stability, Financial 
Services and Capital Markets Union.  After the results of the referendum, Lord 
Hill, who was one of the key promoters of the Capital Markets Union, resigned 
 
 173. In the landmark Euro Area Summit, Eurozone countries stated: “We affirm that it is 
imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.” Euro Area Summit 
Statement, at 1, June 29, 2012, available in full at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs 
/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf. 
 174. Allport, supra note 127, at 14. 
 175. Id. at 11. 
 176. Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 697. 
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and Mr. Dombrovskis (Latvia), Vice-President of the Commission and 
Commissioner for the Euro and Social Dialogue, has taken over his position.177  
Given that the UK is still part of the EU a new UK Commissioner for the 
Security Union has been appointed, Sir Julian King.178  However, from the 
Mission Letter from the President of the Commission, it emerges that the new 
Commissioner will be mostly in charge of implementing “concrete operational 
measures,”179 rather than focusing on policymaking.  Moreover, Sir Julian will 
not represent the Commission in the European Parliament and at meetings of 
national ministers; a crucial role maintained by the previous Commissioner.180  It 
is clear that the representative for the UK in the College of Commissioners is not 
anymore considered as formally equal, i.e., with the same powers and 
prerogatives, to the other Commissioners.  His role has been ultimately curtailed, 
thus weakening the equality paradigm that characterizes a group dominated by 
the EM form of sociality. 
Such an epitomic case explains a broader dynamic.  Once the common 
interest is understood as the group norm bonding the Union together as a 
legal community and driving the decisions of treaty-based institutions, the 
socio-psychological standpoint explains how a sharper distinction between 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries polarizes the decision-making process 
in two sub-groups.  As a result, a conflict between “insiders” and “outsiders” 
in the Eurozone may emerge in institution where all Member States are 
called on to cooperate, even when the decision making process is dominated 
by a relational mode that is not CS.  Within such groups, the existence of a 
profound dissent not only affects the political relationships among Member 
States, but it is likely to call into question the very existence of both a shared 
bond and the equal relation that ensures the cooperation among its members.  
The erosion of the common interest — real or idealized — upon which the EU 
is constructed has therefore cascading consequences throughout the different 
decision-making centers of the EU institutional framework.   
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 179. Mission Letter from Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, 
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B. The Experience of Centrifugal Tensions: “Insider vs. 
Outsider” 
 
The existence of Member States that partake in only some features of 
the Union is not new in the history of the EU and is often referred to as a 
phenomenon of differentiated integration.  Accordingly, Member States may 
opt for different levels of integration ensuing different levels of abdication of 
state prerogatives, on specific matters, towards the supranational institutional 
apparatus.181  Differentiation characterizes the genesis of the EU that from a 
small group of founding members progressively enlarged and conflated 
different communities into a supranational union.  In this process different 
opt-out clauses, notably to the Schengen Agreement and to the monetary 
union, have been granted to Member States.  Nonetheless, the division 
between countries that adopted the euro and countries that opted out is 
becoming more pronounced.  Following the recent crises and the 
establishment of the Banking Union the risk of a two-speed Europe has 
been particularly strong.  There is even a risk for differentiation to evolve 
into fragmentation, as already witnessed in the discontent that has animated 
the debate over the UK leaving the Union.  With the Brexit vote, 
fragmentation is now becoming a tangible risk that the EU has to tackle.   
Aside from any speculation over the possible future of the UK and the 
EU as a whole, the theory of the forms of sociality applied to EU financial 
regulators helps to identify an increasingly sharp division within groups of 
individuals entrusted with decision-making powers.  Such a division 
implies that outsiders, i.e., countries not participating in a given project 
harden their positions, while insiders, i.e., countries partaking in the new 
project, expect the former to join.182  Beyond this, a sociopsychological 
standpoint indicates that the differentiation between outsiders and insiders 
may induce insiders to concentrate around a new shared interest that 
defines a new bond, or even a new common identity, which, in turn, is 
further legitimized by the existence of outsiders not sharing such a bond, 
whose common interest may harden as well towards a new shared objective.183  
 
 181. See Benjamin Leruth & Christopher Lord, Differentiated Integration in the 
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Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leuffen & Berthold Rittberger, The European Union as a 
System of Differentiated Integration, Politicization and Differentiation, 22 J.  EUR.  PUB.  
POL. 764 (2015); Jean-Francois Jamet, The Optimal Assignment of Prerogatives to Different 
Levels of Government in the EU, 49 J.  COMMON MRKT. STUD. 563 (2011). 
 182. Thierry Chopin & Christian Lequesne, Differentiation as a Double-Edged Sword: 
Member States’ Practices and Brexit, 92 INT’L AFF.  531 (2016). 
 183. Fiske notes that CS, in its extreme form, may imply “a contrast between the subjective 
‘we’ and the objectified ‘they.’” Fiske, Four Forms of Sociality, supra note 16, at 699.   
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The unfolding events concerning Brexit offer a powerful illustration of such a 
group dynamic.  A progressive crystallization of different positions around 
new or reinforced shared objectives emerges from the declarations of 
European politicians during the current talks, preceding the formal 
commencement of the EU-UK negotiations.  In particular, reports over the 
alleged stance of EU negotiators to use French, rather than English, as the 
official language of the negotiation process regarding the EU-UK 
relationships signals, other than a possible pre-negotiation tactic, the search 
for a new group identity for EU Member States.184  Likewise, the 
polarization of a group around a hardened common interest, towards which 
individual interests converge and are superseded, is apparent if one 
considers that negotiations will be conducted between the EU — a block of 
twenty-seven countries that is expected to act, by virtue of the legal 
obligations established in the Treaties, as a unitary entity protecting its 
existence — and the UK, a single sovereign state.  This polarization is 
exemplified by the fact that the first meetings of the European Council after 
Brexit — on June 29, 2016 (Brussels) and on September 16, 2016, 
(Bratislava) — were held informally, without the participation of the UK.  
They led to what has been labeled as the Bratislava Declaration and 
Roadmap that deals with the new institutional setting of the Union.185 The 
Declaration reaffirmed the necessity of pursuing a common interest and of 
also correcting the flaws of the EU, but without putting forward any 
concrete policy decision.186  In contrast, during the recent official meeting 
of the European Council with all twenty-eight Member States (Brussels, 
October 20 and 21, 2016), Brexit talks were left at the end of the agenda 
and itemized as reflections “on the future of the EU with twenty-seven 
member countries.”187 
 
 184. Francesco Guarascio, Parlez-vous Brexit? EU Negotiator Wants Brits to Talk 
French, REUTERS, Oct.  21, 2016. 
 185. European Council, Bratislava Declaration, 1 (informal meeting, Sept. 16, 2016), available 
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2016/09/16-informal-meeting/. 
 186. In particular, the Bratislava Declaration opens with the following statement: 
“Although one country has decided to leave, the EU remains indispensable for the rest of us.  
In the aftermath of the wars and deep divisions on our continent, the EU secured peace, 
democracy and enabled our countries to prosper.  […] We are determined to make a success of 
the EU with 27 Member States, building on this joint history [emphasis added].”  Id.  at 1. Two 
crucial aspects may be noted from this incipit.  First, the locutions “one country” contraposed to 
“the rest of us” (or “our continent”) point towards a hiatus between a de-individualized outsider 
and the subjective insiders; on that aspect see Juncker’s Speech, supra note 173.  Second, 
reference to the “wars and deep divisions” (as well as to the “joint history”) echoes the Schuman 
declaration of 1950; see supra note 44 and accompanying text.    
 187. See Donald Tusk, President of European Parliament, Remarks of The President of 
The European Parliament Following The European Council Meeting (Oct.  20—21, 2016).   
118 Hastings Int’l & Comp.  L.  Rev. [Vol.  40:1 
Leaving aside the current debates concerning Brexit, the dynamics and 
legal implications of which are beyond the scope of this work, the 
agreement, reached by the UK Prime Minister during the European Council 
(February 18 and 19, 2016) as a condition for the UK to remain, already 
signaled a misalignment between the interests of the EU and those of the 
monetary union.188  Such a separation is sustained by the general opt-out 
for the UK on an ever closer Union.189  Even more, it is expressly stated 
that reference to an ever closer Union contained in the Treaties does not 
constitute a legal basis for expanding the scope, the competencies, or the 
powers of the EU and of its institutions.190  Among the various items of that 
agreement, of particular interest for the purposes of this analysis are those 
defining the perimeters of the Banking Union and the relationships between 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries.  In this respect, the agreement 
advocates for a stronger protection for the latter group of Member States; and, 
hence, a sharper separation between the two groups.  The agreement, albeit 
recognizing the necessity to deepen the monetary union supported by a 
Banking Union, reaffirms the already established principle of 
nondiscrimination towards non-Eurozone Member States and the possibility of 
creating a European Union where the regulation and supervision of banking 
institutions follows two separate paths.  Moreover, the agreement also 
reaffirms a principle already encountered in the OLAF decision and 
according to which the EU institutions involved in the governance of the 
Eurozone should be subjected to EU Law at large, and their decisions 
should involve non-Eurozone Member States when affected.  What is 
certain is that the completion of the Brexit process calls into question the 
applicability of the protections against discrimination based on location and 
currency for the UK financial services industry.191  
The legal implications and the effective departures from the existing 
EU legal framework if the agreement would have been enforced are 
impossible to ascertain; ultimately, given the current circumstances, the 
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document represents a legal memorabilia.  As such, however, the 
agreement may be interpreted as a request for enhanced transparency and 
participatory accountability amongst Member States with different 
priorities.  Nonetheless, a divide within the Union emerges distinctively 
when the agreement and its language are juxtaposed to the agenda set forth 
in the Five Presidents Report issued by the Commission in 2015.192  
The Report, which still marks the agenda of the EU, posits a greater 
level of integration to strengthen economic and monetary union as primary 
items of the EU agenda.  It is envisaged as an action plan in three steps to 
establish a fiscal union, a capital markets union, and, more generally, a 
financial union that should be paired with a reinforced representation of 
Eurozone Member States in international fora, e.g., at the IMF, and within 
the EU, with more structured governance bodies; and, interestingly, 
culminates with a 2025 goal of having a stronger single currency that is 
“attractive for other EU Member States to join if they are ready to do 
so.”193  The resulting division amongst different groups of Member States 
seems to progressively polarize, as the theory of social relations would 
predict, around two group norms.  One is represented by the pursuit of a 
common interest that, in order to achieve financial stability and monetary 
union, requires further integration; whereas the second group intends the 
common interest as more limited and primarily based on economic and 
trade interests that are necessarily shared.  The latter group includes 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
and Sweden,194 but it may also include the UK, shall the UK continue to 
have access to the single market, or to be part of it.  The exact contents of 
such a more contained common interest depends on many variables that 
may open to different future scenarios.   
It may already be noted that the establishment of a Banking Union and 
the project for a Financial Union, may be understood as a reinforcement of 
the group norm bonding (some) members of the EU legal community, which 
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encompasses sovereign entities as well as regulated industries.  This greater 
level of integration is usually justified by the necessity of increasing the 
resilience of European markets towards financial crises.  From a 
sociopsychological perspective, a reinforcement of the group norm also 
represents a step against the possibility of fragmentation of the community 
(especially felt after the UK referendum) whether it arises from either external 
factors, or dissent within the group, or a combination of both.  It follows that 
members participating in the Banking Union, or in any new project leading 
to a stronger integration, are subjected to an “enhanced group norm,” 
according to which the common interest is achieved also through 
regulatory and supervisory convergence. 
The emerging divide is carried through the decision-making process of 
EU bodies and agencies involved in financial regulation.  The different 
priorities and understandings of the group norm are to influence the relational 
dynamics both between and within EU institutions, where the representatives 
of Eurozone and non-Eurozone states cooperate.  Hence, widening the gap 
with nonparticipating countries may result in a higher level of dissent and in 
a weakened equivalence relationship in the EU architectural framework for 
financial regulation.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Attempts to describe the behaviors and the group dynamics driving the 
decision making process of regulators — and, in particular, EU financial 
regulators — have been sketchy and disappointing, as the minute 
comparison of different regulatory approaches or the game metaphor, albeit 
offering useful insights, do not enrich our understanding.  Our work uses 
the rich vocabulary and conceptual frameworks of psychology as it 
approaches financial regulation in the EU from a sociopsychological 
perspective.  Regulators are considered as collective groups of individuals 
and, as such, they respond to the fundamental forms of sociality defining 
any human interaction.  Through these lenses, principles for interpersonal and 
inter-institutional cooperation, membership criteria, organizational structures 
as well as shared goals and objectives shape decision-making for regulators.  
Such principles are formalized in the legal framework, primarily through the 
definition of regulators’ remits and procedural provisions.   
In turn, the legal framework appears to have an impact on the fashions 
in which social interactions occur.  Dominant forms of sociality may be 
identified and specific behavioral patterns emerge for each of the 
institutions here examined.  This explains, under a novel perspective, some 
of the common issues affecting the EU governance apparatus, such as the 
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expanding definition of the common interest, the politicization of the 
Commission, the issues related to the new supervisory agencies (ESAs), and 
the impact of Brexit on the intra-institutional decision-making process of 
financial regulators.  Moving from this first attempt to apply social 
psychology to shed some light on regulators, it is our hope that further 
investigations will be conducted in what appears to be a new approach to 
regulation studies. 
In the context of financial regulation, it emerges that the relational 
structures of EU bodies and institutions are affected by their constitutional status, 
membership rules, and the functional relation they perform vis-à-vis the 
common interest.  Furthermore, different interpretations and understandings of 
the common interest that have been coexisting are now generating a divide 
between Eurozone and non-Eurozone Member States now emphasized by the 
results of the UK referendum.  Such a divide may undermine the core bond that 
characterizes the collective decision-making process when both groups of 
countries are involved in the same decision-making process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
